PhD Dissertations and Master's Theses
2016

Behavioral Traps in Flight Crew-Related 14 CFR Part 121 Airline
Accidents
Jonathan Velázquez

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/edt
Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, and the Management and Operations Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Velázquez, Jonathan, "Behavioral Traps in Flight Crew-Related 14 CFR Part 121 Airline Accidents" (2016).
PhD Dissertations and Master's Theses. 193.
https://commons.erau.edu/edt/193

This Dissertation - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in PhD Dissertations and Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

BEHAVIORAL TRAPS IN FLIGHT CREW-RELATED 14 CFR PART 121
AIRLINE ACCIDENTS

by
Jonathan Velázquez

A Dissertation Submitted to the College of Aviation
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, Florida
March 2016

© 2016 Jonathan Velázquez
All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT
Researcher:

Jonathan Velázquez

Title:

BEHAVIORAL TRAPS IN FLIGHT CREW-RELATED 14 CFR PART
121 AIRLINE ACCIDENTS

Institution:

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Degree:

Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation

Year:

2016

This dissertation examined pilot behavioral traps in the multi-crew Part 121 air carrier
environment. Behavioral traps are accident-inducing operational pitfalls aviators may
encounter as a result of poor decision making. The traps studied were: Loss of
Situational Awareness; Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections and Checklists;
Peer Pressure; Get-There-Itis; and Unauthorized Descent Below an Instrument Flight
Rule (IFR) Altitude. The purpose of this dissertation was to study the nature of their
occurrence in the airline domain. Another key component was to explore the
relationships between the behavioral traps and factors such as pilot age, pilot flight
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and the first officer certification level.
The dissertation was conducted using an archival combined-methods
methodology. Four subject matter experts analyzed 34 National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) accident reports. Behavioral traps were found in all accidents with Loss
of Situational Awareness and Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and
Checklists dominant. The SMEs were able to identify many pilot actions that were
representative of the behavioral traps.
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During the qualitative analysis, various themes began to emerge which played
important roles in many accidents. These emerging themes were Crew Resource
Management issues, Fatigue, Airline Management, and Flying Outside the Envelope.
The quantitative analysis discovered a moderate correlation, r = -.34, p = .05, between the
Captain’s Flight Experience and the behavioral trap Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR
Altitude. No other correlations were found to be significant between the variables and
the behavioral traps. The findings of this study indicated that behavioral traps were
prevalent in airline accidents including habitual noncompliance by pilots. Further
research should focus on other flight domains and other informational sources such as air
taxi operators, incident accounts, and flight recorded data. Attitude management training
is recommended.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study examined pilot behavioral traps in the multi-crew Part 121 air carrier
environment. Behavioral traps may be evidence of human error and poor decision
making. Approximately three out of four airplane accidents result from human error
(Broome, 2011). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducts research on
human error in an effort to understand how people behave in a variety of situations.
Studying human behavior in aviation can help mitigate the rate of accidents due to human
error. Research on aviator actions in the cockpit led to the discovery of various unsafe
pilot behaviors some called hazardous attitudes and others behavioral traps (FAA, 2009).
Unsafe pilot behaviors have been of interest to the FAA for many years (FAA,
1991; FAA, 2004; FAA, 2008; FAA, 2009). The FAA has termed some of these
behaviors as hazardous attitudes, and they are categorized as: Macho, Anti-authority,
Impulsivity, Resignation, and Invulnerability (FAA, 2009). Other pilot behaviors are
named operational pitfalls or behavioral traps. In addition to the five hazardous attitudes,
these accident-inducing qualities are: Peer Pressure; Mind Set, Get-There-Itis; DuckUnder Syndrome; Scud Running; Continuing Visual Flight Rules (VFR) into Instrument
Conditions; Getting Behind the Aircraft; Loss of Positional/Situational Awareness;
Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves; Descent Below the Minimum En Route
Altitude (MEA); Flying Outside the Envelope; and Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and Checklists. In order to assist pilots in managing these behaviors, in 1991
the FAA published the Advisory Circular (AC) 60-22 named Aeronautical Decision
Making (ADM), commonly known as the ADM manual.
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The FAA defines ADM as the organized approach to the mental process used by
pilots to unfailingly attain the best course of action given a set of circumstances (FAA,
2008). Poor decision making skills can lead to error or accidents. According to the FAA
(2009), the first two steps of ADM are “(1) identifying personal attitudes hazardous to
safe flight and (2) learning behavior modification techniques” (p. 5-3). During singlepilot operations, aviators may use AC 60-22 as a guide to identify personal attitudes that
are unsafe for flying. During multi-crew operations, pilots may refer to AC 120-51e,
Crew Resource Management (CRM) training (FAA, 2004), for further guidance.
CRM is the effective use of all available resources for commercial flight crews to
ensure a safe and resourceful operation while at the same time reducing error and
increasing efficiency. Helmreich and Foushee (1993) gathered statistics on commercial
aviation accidents from 1959 to 1989 and found that human errors of flight crews were
the cause in more than 70% of accidents. The understanding of pilot attitudes and their
role in team dynamics or impact on CRM still requires further research (Salas, Shuffler,
& Diaz, 2010). It is generally accepted that personality has an influence on behavior and
that this, in turn, places an individual at greater or less risk of accident involvement
(Hunter, 2005), despite the fact an accident inclined personality type has been difficult to
establish (Grey, Triggs, & Haywarth, 1989; McKenna, 1988). The study of unsafe pilot
attitudes has extended many decades (Casner, 2010; Hunter, 2005; Lester & Bombaci,
1984; Mosier et al., 2012; Murray, 1999; Shappell et al., 2007); however, much of the
research has been limited to the general aviation (GA) domain and to the five classical
hazardous attitudes (Berlin et al., 1982; Kaempf & Klein, 1994; Stewart, 2008; Wetmore
& Lu, 2006).

2

Significance of the Study
This study sought to reveal the presence of behavioral traps in the FAR Part 121
airline domain. The study leads to a greater understanding of how behavioral traps affect
team dynamics in the cockpit and a specific understanding of how behavioral traps affect
aeronautical decision making and ultimately flight safety. In addition, knowledge of
these behavioral traps in crews can influence portions of CRM training to include
hazardous behavior identification and modification techniques.

Statement of the Problem
Various studies have suggested the presence of many unsafe pilot attitudes during
airplane accidents and the existence of personality factors that impair judgment.
However, no published study had directly examined the presence of behavioral traps
within crew operated flights. Instead, studies concerning unsafe pilot behavior have been
mostly limited to the single-pilot and/or the GA domain. CRM training has helped
reduce the presence of lone wolves or individuals who are self-reliant, technically
competent, and slightly narcissistic in their own capacities (Foushee, 1984). However, in
our attempt to reduce the rate of accidents, it is important that researchers continue to
explore how aircrews are impacted by the individual differences that their group
members bring to the table (Salas et al., 2010). This exploration includes the aeronautical
decision making of crews.
Poor decision making can be a harbinger of behavioral traps and increase the
likelihood of an aviation accident. Examples of behavioral traps include the pressure to
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complete a flight as planned, the desire to please passengers or to meet schedules, and the
determination to get the job done (FAA, 2009). Studies have suggested the presence of
these dangerous attitudes during airplane accidents (Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos,
2007; Drinkwater & Molesworth, 2010; O’Hare & Wiegmann, 2003; Veillette, 2006;
Wetmore, Bos, & Lu, 2007).

Purpose Statement
This study examined pilot behavioral traps in the multi-crew, Part 121 air carrier
environment. By examining the behavioral traps, the products of this research provide a
greater understanding of how aircrews deal with attitudes or pilot behaviors that threaten
flight safety. Wetmore and Lu (2006) explained that their inquiry of pilot hazardous
attitudes had only focused on Part 91 operations; they posited that because pilots will
begin their flying careers in the GA domain, their initial study should also focus on that
segment of the population. Although their plans were to continue to Part 135 and 121
operations, no further examination was accomplished in these areas. It is the
investigation of factors that influence the cognition and behavior of people that helps
researchers and trainers find useful ways to change systems in order to reduce the
potential for disaster (Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johannesen, & Sarter, 2010).
A close examination of the original 12 behavioral traps reveals that many of them
are not applicable to the environment of a Part 121 airline – specifically, Scud Running,
Continuing VFR Flight into Instrument Conditions, Operating Without Adequate Fuel
Reserves, and Flying Outside the Envelope. Thus, the following behavioral traps will be
studied: Loss of Situational Awareness; Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections,
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and Checklists; Peer Pressure; Get-There-Itis; and Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR
Altitude. These behavioral traps are applicable to the Part 121 air carrier environment.
These include behaviors that share common definitions with each other (Descent Below
the MEA is similar to Duck-Under Syndrome, and Loss of Positional/Situational
Awareness is similar to Getting Behind the Aircraft). In addition, some of these
behavioral traps involve direct pilot action (Duck-Under-Syndrome and Operating
Without Adequate Fuel Reserves) while others encompass more cognitive attitudes (Peer
Pressure and Mind Set).
Jeppesen (2014) classified the behavioral traps as instrument operating,
commercial operating, or single-pilot/general aviation. This study used Jeppesen’s
commercial and instrument behavioral traps. In addition, there are only two Jeppesen
(2014) instrument behavioral traps that involve the same action; both Duck-Under
Syndrome and Descending Below the MEA consist of going below an authorized altitude
during an IFR flight. For the purposes of this study, the two were combined into a new
classification termed Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude.
In summary, this research studied the following behavioral traps: Loss of
Situational Awareness (SA); Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and
Checklists; Peer Pressure; Get-There-Itis; and Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR
Altitude, as these behavioral traps are applicable to the Part 121 air carrier environment.
A group of four subject matter experts (SMEs) standardized the classification of the
behavioral traps during the initial portion of the analysis. This standardized classification
of behavioral traps will preclude confusion with unnecessary overlap when studying
similarly defined behavioral traps.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
This study aimed to determine the frequency of behavioral traps occurring in
crew-related aviation accidents. The specific research questions of this study were:
1.

Which behavioral traps are present in Part 121 accidents?

2.

With what frequency do behavioral traps occur in Part 121 accidents?

3.

How are behavioral traps manifested in flight crew-related accidents?

4.

What relationships exist between the pilot behavioral traps and factors
such as age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and
first officer certification level?

The research hypotheses stated that there was a relationship among the behavioral traps
and the factors mentioned above. The null hypotheses were:
H01: There was no relationship between a captain’s age and the following behavioral
traps:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
c) Peer Pressure
d) Get-There-Itis
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR altitude
H02: There was no relationship between a captain’s flight experience (hours flown) and
the following behavioral traps:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
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c) Peer Pressure
d) Get-There-Itis
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude
H03: There was no relationship between a first officer’s age and the following behavioral
traps:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
c) Peer Pressure
d) Get-There-Itis
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude
H04: There was no relationship between a first officer’s flight experience (hours flown)
and the behavioral traps known as:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
c) Peer Pressure
d) Get-There-Itis
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude
H05: There was no relationship between a first officer’s certification level (commercial
versus airline transport pilot) and the following behavioral traps:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
c) Peer Pressure
d) Get-There-Itis
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e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude
H06: There was no relationship between inclement weather and the following behavioral
traps:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
c) Peer Pressure
d) Get-There-Itis
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude
H07: There was no relationship between flight conditions (instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC) versus visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and the behavioral
traps known as:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
c) Peer Pressure
d) Get-There-Itis
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude
H08: There was no relationship between time of day (day versus night) and the behavioral
traps known as:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
c) Peer Pressure
d) Get-There-Itis
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude
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Delimitations
This study focused on the behavioral traps displayed during U.S. aviation
accidents of 14 CFR Part 121 air carrier operations. Foreign or international accidents
were excluded from the analysis, as were accidents classified as having undetermined
causes and those that were attributed to sabotage, suicide, or criminal activity such as
hijacking. This research drew from U.S. aviation accidents attributed to flight crew error
from 1991 to 2013. For the purpose of this study, the factual reports and subsequent
Aviation Accident Reports (AARs) from the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) were used to explore exclusively commercial Part 121 flight crew-related
accidents. Also, excluded from this analysis were the incidents and accidents from Part
135 commercial operations.

Limitations and Assumptions
The FAA-defined behavioral traps also presented somewhat of a challenge to the
study. As stated earlier, some of these behavioral traps involve direct pilot action (DuckUnder Syndrome and Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves) while others
encompass more cognitive attitudes (Peer Pressure and Mind Set). In addition, some
behavioral traps, such as Continuing VFR into Instrument Conditions might not be
applicable to the operating environment of a 14 CFR Part 121 air carrier. Three strategies
were used to handle this situation: (1) the categorization provided by Jeppesen (2014)
where the behavioral traps are classified as either instrument operating, commercial
operating, or single-pilot/general aviation, operating behavioral traps were used, (2) the
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SMEs were aware of these classifications and alerted before entering the coding process,
and (3) the SMEs employed a developed set of guidelines and descriptors used during a
pilot study of behavioral traps by Velazquez, Peck, and Sestak (2015) to identify and
classify pilot actions as behavioral traps. These examples also assisted the SMEs when
identifying the behavioral traps and the underlying human factors issues surrounding
them. These solutions, along with the applicable FAA definitions, provided the SMEs
with an adequate coding scheme.

Definition of Terms
14 CFR Part 121

Part 121 within Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations which contains the operating
requirements for domestic, flag, and supplemental
air carrier operations (FAA, 2016).

Accident

“An occurrence associated with the operation of an
aircraft that takes place between the time any person
boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and
all such persons have disembarked, and in which
any person suffers death or serious injury, or in
which the aircraft receives substantial damage”
(Transportation, 2016).

Aeronautical decision making

“A systematic approach to the mental process used
consistently by pilots to determine the best course
of action in response to a given set of
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circumstances. It is what a pilot intends to do based
on the latest information he or she has” (FAA,
2009, p. G-1).
Aircraft

Device that is used or intended to be used for flight
in the air (FAA, 2016).

Airport/Facility Directory

“An FAA publication containing information on all
airports, communications, and NAVAIDs” (FAA,
2009, G-1).

Attitude

“A learned and relatively enduring perception,
expressed or unexpressed, influencing a person to
think or behave in a fairly predictable manner
toward objects, persons, or situations” (Wilkening,
1973, p. 28).

Attitude management

“The ability to recognize hazardous attitudes in
oneself and the willingness to modify them as
necessary through the application of an appropriate
antidote thought” (FAA, 2009, p. G-1).

Autopilot

“An automatic flight control system that keeps an
aircraft in level flight or on a set course. Automatic
pilots can be directed by the pilot, or they may be
coupled to a radio navigation signal” (FAA, 2009,
p. G-1).
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Behavioral Traps

Also called operational pitfalls, these are unsafe
pilot behaviors or tendencies that dangerously affect
flight safety by hindering aeronautical decision
making and judgment.

Checklist

“A tool that is used as a human factors aid in
aviation safety. It is a systematic and sequential list
of all operations that must be performed to
accomplish a task properly” (FAA, 2009, p. G-1).

Controlled Flight into Terrain

“An accident whereby an airworthy aircraft, under
pilot control, inadvertently flies into terrain, an
obstacle, or water” (FAA, 2009, p. G-1).

Course

“The intended direction of flight in the horizontal
plane measured in degrees from north” (FAA, 2009,
p. G-1).

Crew Resource Management

Effective use of all available resources by air crew
personnel to assure a safe and efficient operation,
reduce error, reduce stress, and increase efficiency
of flight operations. It is predicated upon good
operating practices such as open communication,
leadership, following checklists and standard
operating procedures (SOPs), conducting good
preflight action, and engaging in proper flight
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planning to prepare for unexpected events during
flight (FAA, 2004).
Decision Altitude

“A specified altitude in the precision approach,
charted in feet MSL, at which a missed approach
must be initiated if the required visual reference to
continue the approach has not been established”
(FAA, 2009, G-2).

Decision Height

“A specified altitude in the precision approach,
charted in height above threshold elevation, at
which a decision must be made either to continue
the approach or to execute a missed approach”
(FAA, 2009, p. G-2).

Emergency

A distress or urgent condition (FAA, 2009).

External Pressures

“Influences external to the flight that create a sense
of pressure to complete a flight—often at the
expense of safety” (FAA, 2009, G-2).

Federal Aviation Administration

“An agency of the United States Department of
Transportation with authority to regulate and
oversee all aspects of civil aviation in the United
States” (FAA, 2009, p. G-2).

Flight Path

“The line, course, or track along which an aircraft is
flying or intended to be flown” (FAA, 2009, G-1).
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General Aviation

“All flights other than military and scheduled airline
flights, both private and commercial” (FAA, 2009,
G-1).

Hazardous Attitudes

“Five aeronautical decision-making attitudes that
may contribute to poor pilot judgment: Antiauthority, Impulsivity, Invulnerability, Macho, and
Resignation” (FAA, 2009, p. G-3).

Human behavior

“The product of factors that cause people to act in
predictable ways” (FAA, 2009, p. G-3).

Human Factors

“A multidisciplinary field encompassing the
behavioral and social sciences, engineering, and
physiology, to consider the variables that influence
individual and crew performance for the purpose of
optimizing human performance and reducing
errors” (FAA, 2009, G-3).

Incident

“An occurrence other than an accident that affects
or could affect the safety of operations”
(Transportation, 2016).

Instrument Flight Rules

“Rules and regulations established by the Federal
Aviation Administration to govern flight under
conditions in which flight by outside visual
reference is not safe. IFR flight depends upon
flying by reference to instruments in the flight deck,
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and navigation is accomplished by reference to
electronic signals” (FAA, 2009, p. G-3).
Instrument Conditions

Also known as Instrument Meteorological
Conditions, these are weather circumstances
expressed in terms of visibility, distance from
clouds, and ceiling less than the minimums
specified for visual meteorological conditions,
requiring operations to be conducted under IFR
(FAA, 2009).

Judgment

“The mental process of recognizing and analyzing
all pertinent information in a particular situation, a
rational evaluation of alternative actions in response
to it, and a timely decision on which action to take”
(FAA, 2009, p. G-3).

Notice to Airmen

“A notice filed with an aviation authority to alert
aircraft pilots of any hazards en route or at a
specific location. The authority in turn provides
means of disseminating relevant NOTAMs to
pilots” (FAA, 2009, p. G-3).

Personality

“The embodiment of personal traits and
characteristics of an individual that are set at a very
early age and extremely resistant to change” (FAA,
2009, p. G-4).
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Pilot error

“An accident in which an action or decision made
by the pilot was the cause or a contributing factor
that led to the accident” (FAA, 2009, p. G-4).

Pilot in command

“The pilot responsible for the operation and safety
of an aircraft” (FAA, 2009, p. G-4). This person is
the captain during crew operations.

Poor judgment chain

A series of mistakes or chain of events that may
lead to an accident or incident. “Two basic
principles generally associated with the creation of
a poor judgment chain are: (1) one bad decision
often leads to another; and (2) as a string of bad
decisions grows, it reduces the number of
subsequent alternatives for continued safe
flight”(FAA, 2009, p. G-4).

Situational Awareness

“Knowledge of where the aircraft is in regard to
location, air traffic control, weather, regulations,
aircraft status, and other factors that may affect
flight” (FAA, 2009, p. G-4).

Substantial Damage

Damage or failure which adversely affects the
structural strength, performance, or flight
characteristics of the aircraft, and which would
normally require major repair or replacement of the
affected component. Engine failure or damage
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limited to an engine if only one engine fails or is
damaged, bent fairings or cowling, dented skin,
small punctured holes in the skin or fabric, ground
damage to rotor or propeller blades, and damage to
landing gear, wheels, tires, flaps, engine
accessories, brakes, or wingtips are not considered
“substantial damage” for the purpose of this part
(Transportation, 2016).
Title 14 of the CFR

“Includes what was formerly known as the Federal
Aviation Regulations governing the operation of
aircraft, airways, and airmen” (FAA, 2009, p. G-4).

Visual Flight Rules

“Flight rules adopted by the FAA governing aircraft
flight using visual references. VFR operations
specify the amount of ceiling and the visibility the
pilot must have in order to operate according to
these rules. When the weather conditions are such
that the pilot cannot operate according to VFR, he
or she must use instrument flight rules (IFR)”
(FAA, 2009, p. G-5).

List of Acronyms
AAR

Aviation accident reports

AC

Advisory Circular
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ADM

Aeronautical decision making

ASAS

Aviation Safety Attitude Scale

ASRS

Aviation Safety Reporting System

ATP

Airline transport pilot

CFI

Certified flight instructor

CFII

Certified flight instructor-instrument

COM

Continental Operations Manual

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CRM

Crew resource management

CVR

Cockpit voice recorder

DA

Decision altitude

DH

Decision height

DIT2

Defining issues test 2

HB/CF

Hazardous behaviors/causal factors

DOT

Department of Transportation

ERAU

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FAR

Federal Aviation Regulations

FIT

Florida Institute of Technology

FO

First Officer

FOM

Flight Operations Manual

FPM

Feet per minute

GA

General aviation
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GPS

Global Positioning System

IFR

Instrument flight rules

ILS

Instrument landing system

IMC

Instrument meteorological conditions

LOFT

Line-Oriented flight crew

MDA

Minimum decent altitude

MEA

Minimum en route altitude

MEI

Multi engine instructor

N-HAS

New Hazardous Attitudes Scale

NOTAM

Notice to Airmen

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

Part 91

14 CFR Part 91 General Operating and Flight Rules

Part 135

14 CFR Part 135 Commuter/On-demand Operations

Part 121

14 CFR Part 121 Airline Operations

PIC

Pilot in command

QRH

Quick Reference Handbook

SPSS

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

SA

Situational awareness

SME

Subject matter expert

SOP

Standard operating procedure

TEM

Threat and error management

VFR

Visual flight rules

VMC

Visual meteorological conditions

19

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
Researchers have studied unsafe pilot behaviors for several decades (Casner,
2010; Hunter, 2005; Lester & Bombaci, 1984; Murray, 1999). The studies have focused
mostly on hazardous attitudes, risky behaviors, and pilot cognitive biases, all of which
could impair judgment. Because the behavioral traps have not all been directly studied
within the commercial Part 121 domain, this chapter will review important studies on
hazardous attitudes, pilot cognitive biases, CRM, and Threat and Error Management
(TEM) and exhibit how each relate to the study of behavioral traps.

Understanding Hazardous Attitudes
The study of hazardous attitudes in aviation began in the early 1980s at EmbryRiddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) as a direct outcome of the late 1970s work on
pilot decision making from Jensen and Benel (Martinussen & Hunter, 2010). Berlin et al.
(1982) developed a training curriculum that addressed judgment and decision making.
Berlin found that physiological, psychological, and external pressures influence every
decision a pilot makes. The study also found that a need for a pilot to maintain a selfimage can impair pilot judgment. One of the results of Berlin et al. was the identification
of the hazardous attitudes. Table 1 describes the five hazardous attitudes and provides
the recommended antidote used to counteract each one. The application of the antidote is
possible only after a pilot has been able to first recognize the presence of the hazardous
attitude.
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Table 1
Overview of Hazardous Attitudes with the Appropriate Antidote
Attitude

Characteristics

Antidote

Anti-authority

Pilots with this attitude dislike following the
rules or having someone else tell them what to
do. To these pilots, rules and procedures are a
waste of time and effort.

“Follow the rules;
they are usually
right.”

Impulsivity

This attitude belongs to pilots who feel they
must do something, anything, and immediately.
They seldom take a moment to reflect or
evaluate all the possibilities. Their actions are
the result of whatever comes first to mind.

“Not so fast; think
first.”

Macho

Macho pilots are risk takers, people
“Taking chances is
overconfident about their skills and constantly
foolish”
proving that they are better than everybody else.
To them, they are the best pilots out there.

Invulnerability Similar to Macho-type pilots, these pilots also
take risks but only because in their mind
accidents happen to others and not to them.
Resignation
People with this attitude feel they are incapable
of making a difference. Pilots with Resignationtype attitudes are passive and inactive
throughout their flights. To these pilots, when
something bad happens it is due to bad luck or
the fault of others; someone else is responsible.
Note. Adapted from Jeppesen, 2013, p. 10-31.

“It could happen to
me.”
“I am not helpless;
I can make a
difference.”

Research on Hazardous Attitudes
The FAA (1991) developed a hazardous inventory test to assist pilots in
identifying their own hazardous attitudes. Hunter (2005) proposed two new hazardous
attitudes measurement tests as an alternative to the first one developed by the FAA.
Hunter’s two new tests specifically addressed the relationship of the hazardous attitudes
to accident involvement. These were the Aviation Safety Attitude Scale (ASAS), a scale
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originally administered as part of a national probability sample survey of pilots (Hunter,
1995) and the New Hazardous Attitudes Scale (N-HAS), originally developed by Holt,
Boehm-Davis, Fitzgerald, Matyuf, Baughman, and Littman (1991).
The ASAS measures the pilot’s attitude regarding safety issues. The test items
reflect the five hazardous attitudes suggested by Berlin et al. (1982) and attitudes
concerning weather, the risks encountered in aviation, the likelihood of experiencing an
accident, and self-perceived skill or confidence. On the other hand, the N-HAS consists
of simple declarative statements with a Likert-type response scale. Initially developed
for the measurement of driver attitudes, researchers determined that the N-HAS contained
factors that generally corresponded to four of the hazardous attitudes (Macho,
Impulsivity, Anti-authority, and Resignation).
Wetmore and Lu (2005a; 2005b; 2006) added extensively to the understanding of
how hazardous attitudes affect decision making and risk management. Wetmore, Bos,
and Lu (2007) conducted a case-based analysis for civil aviation accidents using the five
hazardous attitude categories as criteria. The analysis revealed that, similar to previous
research using GA pilots, Invulnerability was the most prevalent hazardous attitude
associated with 80% of the flight instructors involved in accidents. Wetmore and Lu
(2006) studied fatal general aviation accidents and found that an increase in hazardous
attitudes led to greater risk taking, poorer decision making, and a reduction in use of
resources, three very important skills in CRM. In addition, hazardous attitudes were a
contributing factor in 86% of general aviation accidents that involved a fatality (Wetmore
& Lu, 2006). Wetmore & Lu (2005a) found that pilot age does not correlate to hazardous
attitudes. Finally, advanced pilot certificates and flight experience each correlate to a
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reduction in hazardous attitudes (Wetmore & Lu, 2005b). This finding seems intuitive
because generally pilots with more experience should be able to identify and mediate
their hazardous attitudes.
Personality can play a large part in the manner in which hazards are appraised.
Veillette (2006) debated the possibility of an accident-prone pilot and found that pilots
fitting into this category exhibited five traits closely linked to the original five hazardous
attitudes. These were:
(1) disdain toward rules, (2) high correlation between accidents in their flying
records and safety violations in their driving records, (3) frequently falling into
the personality category of thrill and adventure seeking, (4) impulsive rather than
methodical and disciplined in information gathering and in the speed and actions
taken, and (5) disregard for or underutilization of outside sources of information,
including copilots, flight attendants, flight service station personnel, flight
instructors, and air traffic controllers. (FAA, 2009, p. 2-4)
Each of the previously mentioned traits somewhat correspond to the five hazardous
attitudes: (1) Anti-authority, (2) Macho, (3) Invulnerability, (4) Impulsivity, and (5)
Resignation.

The Possibility of a Sixth Hazardous Attitude
Murray (1999) suggested a sixth hazardous attitude called Fear of Loss of Face.
According to Goffman (1955), face is the “positive social value a person effectively
claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact" (p.
213). In other words, it is the interpretation a person has about how others view him or
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her. When a person assumes a self-image, expressed as face, he or she will attempt to
maintain that face or image using the following strategies (p. 404):
•

Avoiding the initiation of social contacts and seeking the safety of solitude
(Goffman, 1955, 1967).

•

Sacrificing tangible rewards to avoid looking foolish (Brown & Garland, 1971).

•

The concealing of anxieties, to avoid being ridiculed or censured (Brown, 1970).

•

In extreme cases, retreating permanently from potential face-losing situations and
even committing suicide (Bond & Hwang, 1986).
Fear of Loss of Face has been recognized to have potential negative effects on

human behavior (Murray, 1999). When a person is embarrassed or looks foolish they
have experienced a Loss of Face. Murray argues that, at the individual level, Fear of
Loss of Face is exemplified when a pilot receives a perplexing ATC instruction and
prefers to remain silent to avoid being judged as incompetent. At the group level,
aviation crews are looked at as good communities, and any person who casts
uncertainties or has doubts may be shamed or ridiculed. This can be used as another
example of Fear of Loss of Face at the group level. Murray called for more research and
a revision of the five hazardous attitudes, originally developed at ERAU, to include Fear
of Loss of Face. The author argued that in a multi-crew cockpit Loss of Face may be the
most critical factor during CRM. Despite Murray’s interesting study, no further inquiry
was made in this topic.
It was not the first time a revision to the hazardous attitudes was recommended.
In the late 1980s, Telfer proposed Deference (1987, 1989) as another hazardous attitude.
Unfortunately, according to Murray (1999), Deference holds close relationship with the
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fifth hazardous attitude called Resignation. As defined, Deference referred to pilots who
surrender to pressure in an attempt to conform to their peers or to authority (1999).

Validating the Hazardous Attitudes
The validity of the original hazardous attitudes and the way they were initially
derived has raised questions with a few researchers.
Lester and Bombaci (1984) claimed that the five hazardous attitudes identified in
the ERAU studies were not based on empirical data but on the ad hoc
contributions of expert opinions. Their validation study and subsequent studies
by Lester and Connolly (1987) and Lubner and Markowitz (1991) cast some
doubt on the validity of the hazardous attitudes concept and suggested the need
for further research. (Murray, 1999, p. 407)
Lester and Bombaci (1984) also found that the majority of general aviation pilots
who exhibit hazardous attitudes fall into the attitude of Invulnerability (43%) followed by
Impulsivity (20%) and Macho (14%). No participants fell into the remaining two
categories. Lester and Connolly (1987) similarly found that the predominant hazardous
thought pattern was Invulnerability (39%) followed by Impulsivity (24%) and finally
Macho (19%). Resignation and Anti-authority response patterns did not emerge. Lester
and Connolly suggested that the hazardous attitude of Anti-authority may be
symptomatic or a behavior overlapping with that of other attitudes, such as
Invulnerability or Macho (Murray, 1999).
Despite the criticism of the conception of the hazardous attitudes, the FAA and
many organizations have noted positive safety outcomes when decision making training

25

includes the hazardous attitudes concepts (Diehl, 1991; FAA, 1991). For example, Diehl
and Lester (1987) conducted a survey after students at ERAU had undergone a six week
course on decision making training with the hazardous attitudes. The survey results
indicated that 56% of students said that their decision making skills had improved; 80%
of the same group recommended inserting the course in the flight training syllabus (Cook,
2002). Archival research using accident reports is necessary to continue exploring the
hazardous attitudes, their validity, and their relationship to other factors such as age
(Stewart, 2006).

Defining Behavioral Traps
Similar to the hazardous attitudes are behavioral traps as described in the FAA’s
(2009) Risk Management Handbook. Behavioral traps are operational pitfalls aviators
may encounter as a result of poor decision making. These 12 accident-inducing
behaviors are defined in Table 2. Veteran aviators have experienced or encountered one
or more of these behaviors in their flying professions (FAA, 1991). Behavioral traps
include the pressure to complete a flight as planned, the desire to please passengers or to
meet schedules, and the determination to get the job done (FAA, 2009).
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Table 2
Overview of Behavioral Traps
Behavioral Trap

Definition

Peer Pressure

Poor decision-making may be based upon an emotional response to
peers, rather than evaluating a situation objectively.

Mind Set

A pilot displays Mind Set through an inability to recognize and cope
with changes in a given situation.

Get-There-Itis

This disposition impairs pilot judgment through a fixation on the
original goal or destination, combined with a disregard for any
alternative course of action.

Duck-Under
Syndrome

A pilot may be tempted to make it into an airport by descending
below minimums during an approach. A pilot may believe that there
is a built-in margin of error in every approach procedure, or a pilot
may not want to admit that the landing cannot be completed and a
missed approach must be initiated.

Scud Running

This occurs when a pilot tries to maintain visual contact with the
terrain at low altitudes while instrument conditions exist.

Continuing Visual
Spatial disorientation or collision with ground/obstacles may occur
Flight Rules (VFR)
when a pilot continues VFR into instrument conditions. This can be
into Instrument
even more dangerous if the pilot is not instrument rated or current.
Conditions
Getting Behind the This pitfall can be caused by allowing events or the situation to
Aircraft
control pilot actions. A constant state of surprise at what happens
next may be exhibited when the pilot is getting behind the aircraft.
Loss of Positional / In extreme cases, when a pilot gets behind the aircraft, a loss of
Situational
positional or situational awareness may result. The pilot may not
Awareness
know the aircraft’s geographical location or may be unable to
recognize deteriorating circumstances.
Operating Without Ignoring minimum fuel reserve requirements is generally the result
Adequate Fuel
of overconfidence, lack of flight planning, or disregarding applicable
Reserves
regulations.
Descent Below the The Duck-Under Syndrome, as mentioned above, can also occur
Minimum En
during the en route portion of an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
Route Altitude
flight.
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Flying Outside the The assumed high-performance capability of a particular aircraft
Envelope
may cause a mistaken belief that it can meet the demands imposed
by a pilot’s overestimated flying skills.
Neglect of Flight A pilot may rely on short- and long-term memory, regular flying
Planning, Preflight skills, and familiar routes instead of established procedures and
Inspections, and
published checklists. This can be particularly true of experienced
Checklists
pilots.
Note. As defined by the FAA (2008, p. 9-12)

Expanding on the Definitions of Behavioral Traps
This section will expand on the FAA definition of the behavioral traps. Following
these definitions, relationships will be determined between the behavioral traps and other
undesirable pilot conducts such as hazardous attitudes (Table 3), cognitive biases (Table
4), and TEM Errors (Table 5). By illustrating the associations between these harmful
behaviors, the reader will be able to understand the many damaging pilot actions. These
relationships have been carefully gleaned from the literature and were synthesized from
the collected works but have not been tested. Table 6, at the end of the chapter, will
summarize these associations.

Peer Pressure. To function safely in the aviation setting, pilots must understand
how peers impact decision making. Peers are important social components of life.
However, friends, colleagues, and associates may cloud judgment. The desire to conform
to others, to be accepted, and to be right are fundamental needs of human beings. Peer
Pressure can be obvious or subtle, verbal or non-verbal, intentional or unintentional, and
its origin may be personnel or organizational (Kern, 1998). Peer Pressure is a behavioral
trap that affects decision making.
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Mind Set. Pilots are individuals of extreme focus and commitment (Landsberg,
2009). Continuous training and certification processes, especially in the commercial
aviation environment, require these traits. Mind Set is sometimes called mental
expectancy. A pilot exhibits Mind Set through a failure to identify and manage changes
in a situation unlike what was anticipated or planned. Research has shown that because
people make inferences in harmony with their hopes, wishes, and desires (Green, Muir,
James, Gradwell, & Green, 1996), once a person has formulated a way of thinking about
a problem, it appears difficult for him or her to get out of that way of thinking and try a
different approach

Get-There-Itis. Pilots are mission oriented. The behavioral trap known as GetThere-Itis or Get-Home-Itis occurs when mission accomplishment is placed above safety.
This trap happens due to many external factors such as home sickness or the prospect of
an early work departure (Kern, 1998). A pilot’s desire to complete the flight gets
stronger as the person nears the destination. Get-There-Itis may be illustrated by a
disregard of alternate airports or a refusal to abort a landing. Also, Dismukes et al.
(2007) argues that the behavioral trap of Peer Pressure can lead to Get-There-Itis.
Pressure to maintain scheduled arrival time might conceivably lead flight crews to
make less conservative decisions and, in particular, might contribute to plan
continuation errors [Get-There-Itis] such as failure to discontinue an approach
when it becomes inappropriate/dangerous to do so. (p. 280)
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Duck-Under Syndrome and Descent Below the MEA. The behavioral trap
known as Duck-Under Syndrome occurs during flight under IFR. During instrument
approaches to an airport, a pilot in IMC should only descend to a height called minimum
descent altitude (MDA) or decision altitude (DA) before he/she makes a final
determination to land or abort the approach. Some pilots may reveal a tendency to take a
sneak peek by descending below these minimums during an approach. This inclination
may be based on a false belief that there is always a built-in safety factor that can be used
or on an unwillingness to abort a landing. Descent below the MEA is very similar but
occurs during the en route phase of flight, whereas Duck-Under Syndrome occurs during
an approach to an airport.

Scud Running. Scud Running means the pilot deliberately flies under low clouds
while attempting to maintain visual contact outside the airplane. There are many risks
associated with this activity: flight into unseen obstructions or terrain (such as towers or
power lines), loss of aircraft control, forced landings, getting lost, or inadvertent flight
into IMC (Wischmeyer, n.d.), which is another behavioral trap.

Continuing VFR into Instrument Conditions. This behavior occurs when a
pilot under a VFR flight plan (or no flight plan at all) flies into adverse weather or into
weather conditions where controlled flight is only possible by using the aircraft’s
instruments. This type of flight requires additional training the pilot may or may not
possess. This behavioral trap has been one of the most studied by scholars and the FAA
(Ison, 2014).
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Scud Running and Continuing VFR into IMC are very similar to one another. In
many cases, Scud Running leads to Continuing VFR flight into Instrument Conditions. A
Scud Running pilot should get an ATC clearance but usually does not because of
complicated delays it might bring about. Scud Running and Continuing VFR into
Instrument Conditions degrades decision making and flying skills due to self-imposed
stress and fear.

Getting Behind the Aircraft. Pilots are trained to manage flight complexity
successfully. However, as much as a pilot might think otherwise, every person has a
limit. This limitation is related to other factors such as workload. According to the FAA
(2008), Getting Behind the Aircraft occurs when a pilot loses the ability to be proactive
and allows situations and events to control pilot action. The pilot lives in a constant state
of surprise regarding what happens next.

Loss of Positional and/or Situational Awareness. The FAA defines Loss of
Positional and/or Situational Awareness as the maximum expression or ultimate
manifestation of Getting Behind the Aircraft. During Loss of Positional/Situational
Awareness, the pilot is unaware of the geographical position of the aircraft or is oblivious
to the multiple factors that impact the flight (e.g., plane, passengers, environment, air
traffic control).
Jeppesen (2014) has combined Getting Behind the Aircraft and Loss of
Positional/Situational Awareness, and for the purposes of this research the categorization
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of these two behavioral traps by Jeppesen will be used. The combination will be called
Loss of Situational Awareness.

Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves. This behavioral trap occurs less
in Part 121 than in GA operations because air carrier pilots have multiple resources at
their disposal; one of which is dispatch. During airline operations, dispatchers are tasked
with fueling procedures while pilots monitor and assess the available fuel prior to and
during the flight. However, in GA there may be only one set of eyes on the issue;
consequently, there are many instances of Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves.
In 2004, a total of 79 fuel exhaustion accidents occurred, of which four were fatal (Fuller
& Steuernagle, 2006). Of all the factors that lead to aviation accidents, fuel should be
one of the easiest to address.

Flying Outside the Envelope. Flying Outside the Envelope occurs when pilots
exceed airplane limitations such as airspeeds, application of aircraft structure devices,
bank angles, and weight limitations, to name a few. A pilot who flies outside the airplane
parameters may believe rules related to the aerodynamics and performance capabilities of
the aircraft, placed in manuals and/or placards have a built-in safety margin.

Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists. Air carrier
operations are highly scripted (Dismukes et al., 2007). Accident investigators frequently
identify crew errors by comparing their actions to those written in the airline’s
instructional document called the Flight Operations Manual (FOM). The FOM contains
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the procedures and steps to perform during normal and abnormal flight conditions. If at
any time a pilot deliberately or unconsciously bypasses a procedure, checklist, inspection
or flight planning process, the action can be classified under this behavioral trap.
Examples include failure to execute a published procedure, deviations from established
norms, and failure to follow checklist items. A pilot may choose to circumvent the
procedures listed in the FOM due to familiar or routine flight operations or by
overestimating short and long term memory skills.

Behavioral Traps and Hazardous Attitudes
Behavioral traps and hazardous attitudes share many commonalities. An
individual experiencing Anti-authority will probably fall under the behavioral trap of
Duck-Under Syndrome or Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and
Checklists. An aviator exhibiting Macho could experience the behavioral trap known as
Flying Outside the Envelope. Scud Running and Operating Without Adequate Fuel
Reserves are indicative of the hazardous attitude known as Invulnerability. The
behavioral traps known as Mind Set and Get-There-Itis are signs of a pilot affected by
Impulsivity. Lastly, Getting Behind the Aircraft and Peer Pressure both characterize
pilots with the hazardous attitude identified as Resignation. Table 3 illustrates the
associations between hazardous attitudes and behavioral traps that have been carefully
gleaned from the literature.
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Table 3
Association Between Behavioral Traps and Hazardous Attitudes
Behavioral Trap

Hazardous Attitude

Peer Pressure

Resignation

Mind Set

Impulsivity

Get-There-Itis

Impulsivity

Duck-Under Syndrome

Anti-authority; Invulnerability

Scud Running

Anti-authority; Invulnerability

Continuing Visual Flight Rules (VFR) into
Instrument Conditions

Anti-authority; Invulnerability

Getting Behind the Aircraft

Resignation

Loss of Positional / Situational Awareness

Resignation

Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves

Anti-authority; Invulnerability

Descent Below the Minimum En
Route Altitude

Anti-authority; Invulnerability
Macho; Anti-authority

Flying Outside the Envelope
Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and Checklists

Anti-authority; Invulnerability

Research on Risky Airmen and Selected Behavioral Traps
Much research has been conducted on pilot risk assessment and behavior. Within
these research endeavors, a few select behavioral traps have been studied directly or
indirectly. The following pages highlight many of these studies.
O'Hare and Wiegmann (2003) found that pilots who flew into adverse weather
differed in risk perception compared to those who diverted to another airport.
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Specifically, pilots who flew into adverse weather gave lower ratings of the risk of
continuing into adverse weather than those pilots who diverted. However, the pilots who
continued also rated the risk of continuing into adverse weather as higher than the risk of
diverting. Yet, they still chose to fly into the adverse weather.
Pauley, O’Hare, and Wiggins (2008) found that risk tolerance is a good predictor
of risk-taking. Flight instructors were asked to assess the level of opportunity or threat in
a series of 36 scenarios presented on paper. Relationships were established between
many variables such as categories of threat (e.g., environment) and categories of
opportunity (e.g., income from passengers). Their study suggests that some pilots may
fly into adverse weather because of a greater tolerance of risk. The study examined
various behavioral traps indirectly. These were Mind Set, Get-There-Itis, Peer Pressure,
and continued VFR into IMC.
Drinkwater and Molesworth (2010) examined the predictors of pilots’ risk
management behavior. This study sought to determine if there were known attitude and
risk perception markers and/or personal characteristics, such as flight experience and age,
which predicted the acquisition and utilization of risk management skills. The study
presented 56 participants with a risky simulated flight which involved minimal fuel on
board their aircraft and a search for a wayward parachutist. A clear distinction in terms
of risk perception was evident between those pilots who elected to undertake the risky
flight (36 participants) and those who did not (20 participants). This study suggests that
pilots’ recognition and perception of immediate high risks in aviation relate to behaviors
that attempt to minimize risk to the lowest possible level. Of the pilots who undertook
the trip, and thereby encountered a higher level of risk, older pilots were more willing to
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engage in risky behaviors. Finally, those pilots with higher levels of self-confidence
were more eager to attempt to minimize the risks in a hazardous situation.
Hunter, Martinussen, Wiggins, and O’Hare (2011) surveyed over 300 GA pilots
regarding previous weather events and the circumstances associated with those flights.
Pilots completed a web-based questionnaire containing demographic questions, a risk
perception scale, a hazardous events scale, and a pilot judgment scale. The pilots who
reported a flight in which they penetrated weather without authorization or were
concerned about the weather also completed 53 additional questions regarding their
weather encounter. The results of their study indicated that 32% of pilots who flew into
instrument conditions (VFR into IMC) did so deliberately. Marginal weather was
forecast along the route of flight for 33% of the pilots who flew VFR into IMC. In
addition, pilots who flew VFR into IMC had poorer judgment scores and less
conservative personal minimums than those who did not report a weather encounter.
Finally, pilots who flew VFR into IMC were less likely to have an instrument rating than
those who did not fly into adverse weather. Indirectly, the survey examined the
behavioral traps known as Scud Running, Continuing VFR into IMC, Peer Pressure, and
Get-There-Itis.
Survey research can also be used to gauge a pilot’s proclivity to undertake risky
behaviors. Ji, You, Lan, and Yang (2011) conducted a survey of 118 pilots of Chinese
Southern Airlines in an attempt to study the profile of the risky pilot. They concluded
that when risk perception increases, the negative effects of risk tolerance on safe
operational behavior decrease. In other words, safety increased when a pilot was capable
of perceiving risk adequately.
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Pilot Cognitive Biases and Antecedents to Operational Errors
A cognitive bias is a distortion in the way a person perceives reality (Cherry,
2015). There are certain pilot cognitive biases that may affect the safety of flight.
Dismukes et al. (2007) analyzed 19 major U.S. accidents between 1991 and 2000 in
which the NTSB identified crew error as a causal factor. Various common cognitive bias
themes emerged from this study; nine accidents were the result of, or influenced by, plan
continuation bias, a tendency to remain fixed on the pre-determined course of action or
destination. Dismukes also noticed that crews succumbed to increasing workload and
were unable to perform tasks well once the flight demands intensified. Finally, 4 out of
the 19 accidents showed that pilots deviated from explicit guidance or SOPs. The pilot
cognitive biases and operational errors found during this study resemble the behavioral
traps.
Mosier et al. (2012) analyzed a total of 116 Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) reports and 60 NTSB aviation accident reports to focus on human factors issues,
antecedents of errors, and associated operational consequences. According to Mosier,
antecedents are behavioral threats to safety and overall pilot decision making. These
include (p. 1754):
1. Attention. The ability to keep track of current tasks and changing conditions.
2. Automation bias. Overreliance on automation technology leading to loss of
situational awareness.
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3. Expectation-driven processing. Similar to confirmation bias where a pilot seeks
information that confirms rather than disconfirms their current belief of a
situation.
4. Memory issues. Failures in the memory system or inability to recall.
5. Operator state. Vulnerable pilot conditions such as fatigue, stress, and distraction.
6. Team communication. Effective communication among crew members.
7. Monitoring/challenging. Maintaining vigilance during the execution of crew
tasks and inquiring when deviations of correct procedures occur.
Indirectly, Mosier et al. (2012) examined a variety of behavioral traps. For
example, some of the categories (variables) coded in the study were cognitive factors
such as attention errors (Loss of Situational Awareness), expectation-driven processing
and behavior error (Mind Set), and memory failures (Getting Behind the Aircraft). In
addition, the study explored procedural errors (Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and Checklists) and tactical decision errors such as plan continuation error
(Get-There-Itis). The study suggests the presence of many behavioral traps in the
commercial operational environment. Table 4 summarizes the associations between the
pilot cognitive biases or antecedents to operational errors and the behavioral traps.
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Table 4
Association Between Behavioral Traps and the Cognitive Biases or Antecedents
Behavioral Trap

Cognitive Biases or Antecedents

Peer Pressure

Team communication;
monitoring/challenging

Mind Set

Expectation-driven processing

Get-There-Itis

Plan continuation bias

Duck-Under Syndrome

Procedural error

Scud Running

Tactical decision error

Continuing Visual Flight Rules (VFR) into
Instrument Conditions

Tactical decision errors

Getting Behind the Aircraft

Memory failures

Loss of Positional / Situational Awareness

Attention errors

Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves

Procedural errors

Descent Below the Minimum En
Route Altitude

Procedural errors

Flying Outside the Envelope

Procedural errors

Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and Checklists

Procedural errors

The behavioral trap of VFR flight into IMC has captured the attention of many
scholars and organizations and for good reason. A look into a few research facts reveals
why (Ison, 2014):
•

25% of all weather-related accidents in GA are fatal.

•

Of these weather-related accidents, 50% are VFR flights into IMC.

•

72% of VFR into IMC accidents are fatal.
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•

There is a higher incidence of VFR into IMC accidents among individuals with a
private pilot certification or less as compared with people with a higher level of
certification.
Ison (2014) used a regression analysis to examine the variables that better

predicted a VFR into IMC accident or an unrelated VFR into IMC accident. The accident
reports emanated from the NTSB’s database. Factors included terrain, time of day,
weather briefing delivery, flight plan filing, age of pilot, flight experience, pilot
certification, and ATC communication.
Ison (2014) demonstrated that the factors of terrain and the receipt of a weather
briefing statistically influenced VFR into IMC accidents. A significant number of
weather briefings included the statement VFR flight not recommended. Unfortunately, it
seems some pilots are deliberately flying into IMC. Regarding pilot certification, Ison
concluded that the higher a pilot’s certification, the likelihood of a VFR into IMC
accident decreased. Paradoxically, a positive correlation was found between flight
experience and VFR into IMC accidents. Therefore, pilots with more flight time but less
education and training are at greater risk. Finally, age had a negative relationship with
VFR into IMC accidents. Ison called for better education and training to GA pilots
coupled with enhancements in weather briefings so that pilots are better warned and the
hazards of attempted VFR flight into IMC are explained.
Wiegmann and Goh (2000) conducted an experimental study to analyze the
dynamic factors influencing a pilot’s decision to continue a VFR flight into adverse
weather. Variables such as situation assessment, risk perception, and motivation were
studied using a hypothetical (simulated) cross country flight. Differences were measured

40

between those pilots that chose to continue flight into IMC versus those who diverted.
Situation assessment referred to the ability of the pilot to recognize deteriorating weather
conditions. Risk perception was the ability to correctly diagnose deteriorating weather to
include the ability to recognize the risks involved with continuing the flight.
Motivational factors referred to those influences that bias a pilot’s decision making.
These elements include the behavioral trap known as Get-There-Itis or other personal or
social pressures (Wiegmann and Goh, 2000). These motivational biases may hinder
flight safety even after correct situation assessment and risk perception is accomplished.
The procedure involved a pre-simulation questionnaire using the Aeronautical
Risk Judgment Questionnaire (O’Hare, 1990). A total of 32 pilots answered questions
regarding their demographic background, self-judgment, hazard awareness, and risk
awareness. Following the pre-experimental feedback form, participants used the X-Plane
Flight Simulation Program on a Pentium III 450 computer (Wiegmann and Goh, 2000).
The simulation included yoke and rudder pedals and control of parameters such as
ceiling, visibility, and topographical features. The departure weather was set to VFR;
however, 45 minutes into the flight, the conditions were reduced to below VFR (i.e., 2
miles visibility and 1,500 feet ceiling). Once the simulation ended, pilots were required
to complete another questionnaire on features such as situational awareness, selfjudgment, and decisional factors.
Of the 32 pilots, 22 (68.75%) continued flight into adverse weather. Although
slightly less than half of the participants were certificated pilots, that is, possessed a
Private Pilot or higher certification, no statistically significant differences were found
between pilots who decided to continue with the flight and those who chose to divert. A
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discriminant analysis demonstrated that visibility estimates (.929), skill and judgment
ratings (.602) and frequency of risk-taking behavior (-.562) were most important in
predicting whether or not a pilot would continue or divert from a VFR into IMC situation
(Wiegmann and Goh, 2002). In combination, these three elements were able to predict
whether a pilot would continue or divert with 87.1% accuracy.
According to Williams (2011), VFR flight into IMC has resulted in 87% fatalities
in GA flights from 1999-2008. Lamentably, the acquisition of a weather briefing and the
completion of an instrument rating does not guarantee safeguarding against VFR into
IMC. In more than 50% of VFR into IMC accidents, pilots had received a weather
briefing while 47% of pilots were instrument rated (Williams, 2011). Williams concludes
that correct interpretation of a weather briefing coupled with a skepticism or pessimism
about deteriorating weather may help pilots during the decision-making process.
Williams also advocates developing and using a personal minimums checklist.

CRM and Behavioral Traps
CRM is an FAA-mandated professional training program provided by air carriers
to assist captains and first officers in their use of all resources (human, hardware, and
software). Effective CRM practices are predicated on following checklists, using SOPs,
conducting appropriate preflight actions, and engaging in proper flight planning. Each of
these practices helps prepare pilots for unexpected events during flight.
When the CRM program began, the concept was known as Cockpit Resource
Management and was for pilots only. However, Cockpit Resource Management
programs evolved to include flight attendants, maintenance personnel, dispatchers, and
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others and became crew resource management (Block, Sabin, & Patankar, 2007). The
current definition of crew resource management includes all groups routinely working
together with the flight crew who are involved in the decision making processes required
for the safe operation of the flight (FAA, 2004).
CRM training is one way to address the challenge of optimizing the
human/machine interface and accompanying interpersonal activities (FAA, 2009).
Advisory Circular 120-51e (2004) is the official FAA document that provides guidance to
air carriers on implementing CRM. According to the FAA (2004, p. 6), an effective
CRM training program:
•

Includes a comprehensive system of applying human factors concepts to
improve crew performance.

•

Embraces all operational personnel.

•

Can be blended into all forms of aircrew training.

•

Concentrates on crewmembers’ attitudes and behaviors and their impact on
safety.

•

Uses the crew as the unit of training.

•

Requires the active participation of all crewmembers. It provides an
opportunity for individuals and crews to examine their own behavior and to
make decisions on how to improve cockpit teamwork.

The major topics within a typical CRM training program are: (a) communications
processes, (b) decision behaviors, (c) team building and maintenance, (d) workload
management, (e) and situational awareness. Unfortunately, the FAA does not provide
specific guidelines relating to attitude management as part of CRM training (FAA, 2004),
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nor does it provide any information about hazardous attitudes, behavioral traps, or the
various cognitive biases.
Line-Oriented Flight Crew (LOFT) is a scenario-based training exercise where the
crews complete the simulated flight in real time as they would during a regular trip.
LOFT has been the preferred CRM tool during air carrier training for many years
(Wagener & Ison, 2014). LOFT consists of simulator sessions where crews apply the
CRM principles learned during class sessions. During LOFT sessions, both normal and
abnormal situations are presented. Unfortunately, these LOFT sessions have been
applied ineffectively and intermittently, and some sessions have not even been mandated
by regulating authorities in all countries (Dismukes et al., 2007; Salas et al., 2010;
Wagener & Ison, 2014).
The creation of CRM and like programs does not always guarantee the absence of
unsafe pilot behaviors (Cook, 2002). Dismukes et al. (2007) cites inadequate knowledge
or experience provided by training and/or guidance as a factor in 37% of NTSB accidents
between 1991 and 2001. In other words, pilots were not given adequate instruction about
problems known by some of the sectors of the industry to exist or, “found themselves in
challenging situations for which they had received training, but the experience received
from that training was of inadequate fidelity to the actual situation, inadequately detailed,
or incomplete (Dismukes et al., 2007, p. 298).

TEM
During the late 1990s, TEM was introduced into CRM training. It is accepted that
errors cannot be eliminated but perhaps can be avoided, managed, and their effects
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mitigated (Maurino & Murray, 2010). According to Helmreich, Merritt, and Wilhelm
(1999), flight crews often use tactics to minimize and mitigate errors during abnormal
and normal (day-to-day) activities. These strategies during CRM are called error
management.
The current TEM model lists errors under four areas (Maurino & Murray, 2010, p.
10-14). These errors are:
1. Intentional noncompliance [error]. These are intentional deviations from
regulations and/or operators’ procedures.
2. Procedural [error]. This is where the intention is correct, but the execution is
flawed. They also include errors where the crew simply forgot to do
something that was intended—the so-called slips and lapses.
3. Communication error. This includes missing, misinterpreting, or failing to
communicate pertinent information. It can be between crewmembers or
between the crew and external agencies (e.g., ATC, maintenance personnel).
4. Operational decision error. These are decision-making errors in areas which
are not standardized by regulations or operator procedures, and they
compromise safety. To be categorized as a decision error in the TEM
framework, at least one of three conditions must exist: first, the crew must
have had other more conservative options available and decided not to take
them. The second condition is that the decision was not discussed between
the crew members. Third is that the crew had time available but did not use it
to evaluate the decision.
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Each of the afore-mentioned TEM errors share connections with the behavioral traps.
Table 5 explains the associations between the behavioral traps and the list of errors under
the TEM model.

Table 5
Association Between Behavioral Traps and TEM Errors
Behavioral Trap

TEM Error

Peer Pressure

Operational decision error

Mind Set

Operational decision error

Get-There-Itis

Operational decision error

Duck-Under Syndrome

Intentional noncompliance

Scud Running

Intentional noncompliance

Continuing Visual Flight Rules (VFR) into
Instrument Conditions

Intentional noncompliance

Getting Behind the Aircraft

Procedural error

Loss of Positional / Situational Awareness

Procedural error

Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves

Intentional noncompliance

Descent Below the Minimum En
Route Altitude (MEA)

Intentional noncompliance

Flying Outside the Envelope

Intentional noncompliance

Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and Checklists

Intentional noncompliance
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At times, unsafe pilot actions leading to accidents are not mistakes, but rather
violations or intentional noncompliance from checklists or SOPs. English and Branaghan
(2012) proposed a new violation taxonomy with four categories:
•

Improvement. The intention is to increase safety or production, a desire to do
better.

•

Malevolent. The intention is to cause harm or reduce production, a desire to do
damage.

•

Indolent. The intention is to increase operator ease, a desire for lethargy.

•

Hedonic. The intention is to increase operator excitement, a desire for sensation.
Using this new taxonomy, the first author reviewed NTSB accident reports with

substantial narrative information from 1980 to 2008 that included at least one of the
following terms violation, disregard, suicide, non-standard, intentional, or noncompliance. The authors looked to compile accounts together if they could be considered
somewhat similar, splitting only those that appeared profoundly different. The authors
tested the reliability of the new taxonomy by having aviation safety experts review
accident reports and classify the violation behavior. The authors hoped that other
researchers, using this new taxonomy as a tool to continue to understand the motivational
factors surrounding unsafe pilot behavior, could complete additional studies.
Participants were pilots familiar with use of the Human Factors Analysis
Classification System or similar schemes. They had varied civilian and military
backgrounds and were either faculty at the U.S. Air Force Academy, safety analysts at a
U.S. major airline, or U.S. major airline pilots working as Line-Oriented Safety Audit
observers. The average self-reported professional flying experience in the returned
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surveys was 11,330 flight hours obtained during 21.2 years working within the aviation
community. All participants were over 21 years old and received no payment for
participation (English & Branaghan, 2012, p. 206).
Helmreich, Klinect, and Wilhelm (2001) stated that the highest percentage of
errors (50%) involved deliberate non-compliance. Klinect et al. (2001) found that
examples of willful violations occurred in 35% of regular air carrier flights observed.
Finally, Velazquez et al. (2015) found that the behavioral trap known as Neglect of Flight
Planning, Preflight Inspection, and Checklists was found in 72% of accidents attributed to
flight crews in Part 135, Part 121, and other foreign accidents analyzed between 1988 and
2006.
Although the above-mentioned evidence suggests that some pilots have a general
disregard for rules, Maurino and Murray (2010) state that often optimization “is the most
frequent cause of intentional noncompliance and is perceived by the crews as being
necessary, because the rules and the tasks are often incompatible and sometimes mutually
exclusive” (p. 10-14). Optimization is defined by Merriam-Webster’s (2015) online
dictionary as the act, process, or methodology of making something (such as a decision)
as fully perfect, functional, or effective as possible. Many researchers prefer the word
adaptability (FAA, 2004; Fornette, Bourgy, Jollans, Roumes, & Darses, 2014).
Adaptability is defined as “an individual’s ability, skill, disposition, willingness, and/or
motivation, to change or fit different task, social, and environmental features” (Ployhart
& Bliese, 2006, p. 13). Regardless of the term used, crewmembers apply different
strategies to enhance management of complex and unforeseen situations during flight.
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During TEM, aircrews apply risk management strategies to avoid, trap, and
mitigate errors (Velazquez & Bier, 2015). However, for pilots, recognizing self-attitudes
or personality threats that are hazardous to flight safety is not easy, although it is a
necessary task during CRM. Furthermore, the act of one crewmember challenging
another crewmember during the recognition of someone else’s negative behavior could
prove quite troublesome. Salas and Cannon-Bowers (2001) call this challenging action
task-related assertiveness, which is the “willingness/readiness of team members to
communicate their ideas, opinions, and observations in a way that is persuasive to other
team members and to maintain a position until convinced by the facts that the other
options are better” (Salas, Wilson, Burke, Wightman, and Howse, 2006, p. 8).
Wagener and Ison (2014) call for strategic cockpit procedures and guidelines on
how to deal with socially sensitive issues such as challenging flight crew members during
multi-crew operations. They suggest that additional research be conducted to identify
breakdowns in CRM. Wagener and Ison also proposed a qualitative study of airline
CRM training to assess themes and alignments of goals, policies, training, and evaluation
with topics such as TEM, human behavior, use of automation, and team dynamics. They
also suggest a study of CRM monitoring and challenging with assertiveness.
According to Broome (2011), execution of good CRM practices is obstructed by
internal barriers such as: frustration, anxiety, hazardous attitudes, anger, and Get-ThereItis, among other elements. In addition, Broome believes that even though CRM has had
wide acceptance, there are still pilots who reject the concept. It is imperative upon senior
management that these individuals are not put in a situation where their attitudes/
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personalities jeopardize the safety of others and are not influential on junior
crewmembers (Helmreich & Butler, 1991).
External factors such as airline management may exacerbate behavioral traps. Air
carrier personnel may negatively affect the decision making capabilities of a crew.
Fanjoy, Harriman, and DeMik (2010) conducted a study to know the individual and
environmental predictors of pilot burnout within Part 121 regional airlines. It seems that
subtle organizational pressures associated with continued employment frequently
overrule common sense decision making that has been the symbol of industry pilots
(Fanjoy et al., 2010). On-time performance, acceptance of airplanes with less fuel, or
inoperative components is adding stress and fatigue to airline pilots. A term called pilot
pushing exemplifies such pressures. Pilot pushing is “the pressure that pilots face from
management to keep airplanes in the air as much as possible by agreeing to fly legs with
critical equipment problems, in severe weather, with reduced fuel requirements, or in a
state of fatigue” (Fanjoy et al., 2010, p. 19). Symptoms of burnout may include
irritability, depression, absenteeism, anxiety, diminished attention, and attrition.
To investigate further, the authors administered a survey regarding pilot burnout
to 248 regional pilots. The survey was an aviation-adapted version of the Maslach
Burnout Inventory-General Studies (MBI-GS). The instrument consisted of 22 questions
designed to measure three aspects of burnout (i.e., exhaustion, cynicism, and professional
efficacy). Likert-type response scales indicated how often the pilots experienced a given
thought or feeling.
The last section of the questionnaire measured the pilots’ perception of pressure
from airline management to complete a flight with questionable safety risks or hazards.
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This included: accepting aircraft with critical equipment problems, starting or
continuing flight into severe weather or icing conditions, accepting critically reduced fuel
requirements to accommodate revenue, and overall pressure to make on-time goals.
Constructed in a format similar to the MBI-GS items, answers to these items indicated
how often the respondents experienced this type of pressure, ranging from 0 (never) to 6
(daily) (Fanjoy, Harriman, & DeMik, 2010, p. 21).
Results from the Fanjoy et al, 2010 study established, among other facts, that:
•

32.6% of the sample population was identified as high burnout candidates,

•

51.8% of the sample was identified as exhibiting high exhaustion levels,

•

2.5% exhibited high cynicism levels, and

•

53.8 % of the sample displayed low professional efficacy levels.

The study further highlights the presence of behavioral traps such as Peer Pressure and
Get-There-Itis.

Attitudinal and Team Factors Affecting Error Detection During CRM
Kontogiannis and Malakis (2009) identified several attitudinal influences that
affect a person’s ability to identify errors during flight. Attitudinal factors refer to “the
orientation the person has to the situation, the feelings and stance towards other
colleagues and the level of arousal or anxiety” (p. 701). These attitudinal factors may
occur during single-pilot operations as well as multi-crew operations. Kontogiannis and
Malakis have summarized a total of four attitudinal factors:
1. Vigilance and Alertness. A pilot may attempt to comprehend an unfamiliar
situation by drawing inaccurate analogies to past experiences. Mistakes in
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vigilance and alertness also refer to complacency or a sense of selfsatisfaction accompanied by unawareness of actual dangers or equipment
deficiencies. This danger is prevented by proper planning, suspicion, and
curiosity before and during a flight.
2. Awareness of Vulnerability. Very much akin to the previous factor, a pilot
decreases his/her awareness of vulnerability during moments of false
optimism. A pilot may be overconfident and tolerant of conflicting evidence
due to recurrent success. A healthy level of skepticism increases awareness to
vulnerability.
3. Degradation and disengagement. It is crucial for a pilot to monitor his/her
own performance and mental state. The symptoms of degradation and
disengagement include staying behind the situation, suffering a constant
distraction, feeling surprised even by small events, and feeling fatigued.
Pilots commonly refer to this factor as being out of the loop.
4. Frustration from errors. As errors build up, further detection of new errors
and later attribution of blame may cause stress and frustration. Nurtured by
harsh self-criticism or fear of blame, pilots may attempt to cover the problems
instead of recovering from them. This attitudinal factor may encourage
groupthink which is a tendency to suppress one’s own arguments if these are
not consistent with that of the team.
The attitudinal factors previously mentioned share analogies with some of the
FAA-defined behavioral traps. An overconfident pilot suffering from a lack of
vulnerability awareness may engage in Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections,
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and Checklists; Duck-Under Syndrome; Operating Without Adequate Fuel Reserves; or
even Flying Outside the Envelope. Degradation and disengagement is analogous to the
behavioral trap known as Getting Behind the Aircraft. Finally, an argument can be made
that the behavioral trap called Peer Pressure may lead to the attitudinal factor known as
frustration from errors.
Kontogiannis and Malakis (2009) also present a series of team factors that affect
the ability to identify errors during crew operated flights. These team factors affecting
error detection are:
1. Assertiveness. The ability to voice concerns during crew operated flights can
prove quite difficult, as indicated earlier. Even so, assertiveness during
normal and abnormal flight events remains an important component of CRM.
2. Cross-checking others and monitoring for signs of fatigue. The ability to
notice signals of a crewmember’s disengagement and degradation is
paramount for the safety of flight.
3. The ability to adopt multiple perspectives. Because crews are often trained in
couples, pilots can frequently determine if the action of their colleague is
aligned with the goals for the flight. This action requires a broader
perspective by the observing pilot. The more tasks are shared among team
members the better a team is prepared to detect errors.
4. Communication of intent. Where the previous factors may fail,
communication remains a key pillar to the effective CRM. Communication
remains the most direct approach to figuring out the intentions of the other
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crew member. Adequate communication may even prevent errors from
occurring in the first place.

First Officer Experience
The NTSB studied several first officer factors that led to many accidents between
1978 and 1990. A total of 32 accidents were available. One of the most intriguing
findings was that 53% of first officers had less than a year of experience in that
capacity/position at the airline (Dismukes et al., 2007). This percentage decreased
slightly in accidents between 1991 and 2001, that is, 41% of first officers had less than a
year of experience in position. 84% of accidents between 1978 and 1990 had incidences
of monitoring and challenging of errors, while this number decreased in accidents
between 1991 and 2001 (68%).
It is conceivable that low time as a first officer at an airline could increase the risk
of accident appreciably. Although airline first officers are trained to high standards and
typically have considerable experience, during the first years, first officers are to some
extent still honing their skills at flying the particular airplane, monitoring, and detecting
errors. During the first year, “first officers are typically on probation (unless they have
previously held flight engineer positions at the same airline) and conceivably may be less
willing to challenge the captain’s decisions and actions” (Dismukes et al., 2007, p. 282).

Additional Individual Factors Associated with Behavioral Traps
Van Benthem and Herdman (2014) conducted an extensive literature review on
the factors that led to Loss of Situational Awareness events in GA and found that the
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interaction of factors such as age, certification level, and total flight hours with pilot
performance continues to puzzle many researchers. Li, Baker, Qiang, Grabowski, &
McCarthy (2005) explored various risk factors associated with aviation accidents and
found that pilots over 65 years of age were more likely to be involved in an accident as
opposed to younger pilots between the ages of 25 to 34 years. Bazargan and Guzhva
(2011) found that pilots over 65 years of age were also more likely to be involved in fatal
accidents than their younger equals. Unexpectedly, pilots with fewer flight hours were
least likely to be involved in fatal accidents (Bazargan and Guzhva). Taylor, Kennedy,
Noda, and Yesavage (2007) reported lower performance for older pilots when “following
ATC messages, traffic avoidance, cockpit instrument scanning, and approach and landing
ability” (p. 201). This last study also found that pilot certification level is the most
reliable indicator of pilot expertise and performance. Finally, Coffrey, Herdman, Brown,
and Wade (2007) found that older pilots missed a larger amount of critical events or
abnormal events both inside and outside the cockpit than their younger counterparts.
Rebok, Qiang, Baker, McCarthy, and Li (2005) studied the relationship between
flight experience and pilot violations in commuter and air taxi pilots. Their data were
collected from the biannual medical certification data and surveillance systems managed
by the NTSB as well as the FAA’s Aviation Medical Examiner System and Medical
Accident System. Results showed that flight experience was negatively associated with
violations. Pilots with less than 5,000 hours of flight time were at a higher risk than
pilots with flight time between 5,000 and 9,999 hours. However, this protective effect of
flight experience lessened as pilots had more than 10,000 hours of flight time.
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Moral Development and Pilots
Perhaps aviation is lacking ethical education and overall awareness of ethical
issues inherent to the industry. Today, more and more professional industries are
increasing ethics education and have a published set of ethical standards. Morality was
defined as a set of human laws that pursue harmony among persons and groups whereas
ethics embraces the study of morality and established practical standards to define
morality more precisely (Diels, Northam, & Peacock, 2009). According to Diels et al.
(2009), continued lectures on ADM and CRM should be supplemented by education in
ethics, particularly because pilots are faced with dilemmas and tradeoffs such as
effectiveness, efficiency, safety, and satisfaction. Although aviation is largely regulated
and imbued with standard operating procedures, there are always gray areas that require
judgment and ethical decision making.
Using one of the most common measures of moral development, the Defining
Issues Test 2 (DIT2) Diel et al. conducted a study of three groups of pilots (e.g., students,
flight instructors, and faculty members at ERAU) to examine moral development levels
in terms of P score on the DIT2. All completed assessment response sheets were returned
to the University of Minnesota Center for the Study of Ethical Development, for scoring.
Comparisons were then conducted between the three groups. No significant relationships
were found between age and moral development nor education and moral development.
However, the flight instructors and student pilots scored lower than expected in the DIT2
questions. Concern was elevated because flight students scored lower than regular high
school students, and flight instructors scored lower than average college students. The
authors posited that this may be due to a lack of ethics training in aviation programs.
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A Study Targeting Commercial Operations and Hazardous Behaviors
Cook (2002) conducted a study on hazardous behaviors and causal factors
(HB/CF) found in Part 121 and 135 accidents and incidents. The NTSB has a list of
common HB/CF for accident investigative purposes. The HB/CF were those defined by
the NTSB, and the author was instructed to select these codes. The NTSB behavioral
categories included in Cook’s study were:
•

Inadequate preflight inspection

•

Decision height disregard

•

Organizational pressure

•

Anxiety

•

Over confident

•

Inflight planning not followed

•

Other procedures not followed

•

Other pressure

•

Depression

•

Other psychological factor

•

VFR into IMC

•

Number of other procedures not followed

•

Alcohol

•

Stress

•

Flight into known adverse weather

•

False information
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•

Illegal drugs

•

Complacency

•

Flight with known aircraft deficiencies

•

Self-induced pressure

•

Medication

•

Ostentatious display
The Cook (2002) study consisted of a literature review and statistical analyses on

Part 121 and Part 135 accidents from 1983 to the year 2000. The analyses conducted as
part of the study of accidents included frequency distributions, regression, and
correlations to identify HB/CF frequency distributions and relationships between
behavioral and demographic data. VFR into IMC, one of the FAA-defined traps, was the
leading behavior found in 28.7% of the accidents analyzed. The average pilot age was 38
years old with an average of 5,752 Pilot in Command (PIC) hours accumulated. A
regression model predicted that as age increased total HB/CF decreased. Finally, IMC
was found in 56.7% of accidents (Cook, 2002).
A few behavioral traps were studied during the Cook (2002) study. These were:
VFR into IMC, other procedures not followed, inadequate preflight inspection, and
decision height. Though the literature reviewed and the statistical analyses help confirm
the existence of unsafe pilot attitudes at the commercial level, the study suffers from
various drawbacks. CRM has traditionally been a Part 121 assignment and not always
the case for Part 135 operators until recently. This fact can yield different results when
analyzing the hazardous behaviors from Part 135 operators versus those found in Part 121
pilots. Unexpectedly, as admitted by Cook, VFR into IMC was the leading hazardous
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behavior across all accidents analyzed. This finding should not occur if accidents from
Part 121 are analyzed separately from those accidents in Part 135 because Part 121
operations are strictly conducted under IFR. Furthermore, the author combines accidents
from fixed wings airplanes with rotary wings or helicopter operations.
Perhaps the major drawback from the Cook (2002) study was the identification of
the hazardous behaviors by only the author himself. Although Cook requested specific
information from the NTSB to ensure that accidents encompassed such behaviors, it is
the author himself who is the only person categorizing the behaviors and conducting the
literature review of the accident reports. The current study used a team of SMEs to
reduce bias and increase reliability during the identification of the FAA-defined
behavioral traps.
Cook (2002) found many disconnects between the captain and the rest of the
crewmembers, particularly the flight crewmembers. Problematic issues included the
captain ignoring the crew, complacency, overconfidence, and creating a hostile cockpit
atmosphere. Because the study combines accidents from rotary and fixed-wing and Part
121 with Part 135 operations, these findings need to be segregated to see if the
problematic areas are common to all commercial sectors and operations.

Summary
Although it is regularly quite difficult to determine with certainty why accident
crewmembers perform the way they did, it is possible to understand the types of errors
and behaviors to which pilots are vulnerable and to identify the cognitive, task, and
organizational factors that profile that vulnerability (Dismukes et al., 2007). Hazardous
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attitudes and behavioral traps increase the likelihood of an aviation accident due to pilot
error. Studies have suggested the presence of many unsafe pilot attitudes during airplane
accidents and the existence of cognitive biases that impair judgment. Unfortunately,
many studies have been limited to the single-pilot GA domain.
The proposed study will investigate behavioral traps in multi-crew Part 121
environments. Many inconsistencies remain as to how age and flight experience relate to
unsafe pilot attitudes. For example, Wetmore and Lu (2006) discovered that increases in
hazardous attitudes relate to greater risk-taking, poorer aeronautical decisions, increased
pilot error, and decreased utilization of cockpit resources. Wetmore & Lu (2005a) found
that pilot age does not correlate to hazardous attitudes. Finally, advanced pilot
certificates and flight experience each correlate to a reduction in hazardous attitudes
(Wetmore & Lu, 2005b). However, according to Drinkwater and Molesworth (2010),
older pilots are more willing to engage in risky behaviors, and those with higher levels of
self-confidence attempt to minimize the risks in a hazardous situation. Li et al. (2005)
and Bazargan and Guzhva (2011) have established that older pilots are also more likely to
be involved in accidents (fatal and non-fatal). Yet, according to Pauley et al. (2008), age
and flight experience do not affect a pilot’s decision to penetrate adverse weather. One of
the objectives of this study was to settle many of these inconsistent findings but in the
multi-crew environment.
The FAA lacks guidance in attitude management training within CRM
(Velazquez et al., 2015). Unsafe pilot actions, including noncompliance and willful
violations, are present in many air carrier operations. Error management in CRM can
assist in identifying and mitigating threats only when pilots are cognizant of attitudes that
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pose a threat to flight safety, either their own or those present in fellow crewmembers,
and take the necessary actions to prevent these.
To increase overall aviation safety, researchers must continue to understand what
kind of errors still exist and what makes pilots vulnerable to these unsafe behaviors
including the interplay of factors contributing to these conducts. These factors consist of
weather, which was cited in 33.9% of aviation accidents between 1978 and 2001
(Dismukes et al., 2007), age, flight conditions, and time of day, among others. As
previously mentioned, although no direct study has been accomplished on behavioral
traps within the air carrier environment, some of the hazardous attitudes, cognitive biases,
and errors relate to the behavioral traps themselves. Table 6 summarizes these
relationships.
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Table 6
Summary of the Associations Between Behavioral Traps and Other Pilot Behaviors
Behavioral Trap
Peer Pressure

Mind Set

Get-There-Itis
Duck-Under
Syndrome
Scud Running
Continuing VFR
into IMC
Getting Behind the
Aircraft
Loss of Situational
Awareness
Operating Without
Adequate Fuel
Reserves
Descent Below the
Minimum En
Route Altitude
Flying Outside the
Envelope
Neglect of Flight
Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and
Checklists

Hazardous Attitude Cognitive Biases
Resignation

Communication;
monitoring
/challenging

TEM Errors
Operational
decision error

Impulsivity

Operational
Expectation-driven
decision error
processing

Impulsivity

Plan continuation
bias

Tactical decision
error

Operational
decision error
Intentional
noncompliance
Intentional
noncompliance

Anti-authority;
Invulnerability

Tactical decision
error

Intentional
noncompliance

Resignation

Memory failures

Resignation

Attention errors

Anti-authority;
Invulnerability

Procedural errors

Intentional
noncompliance

Anti-authority;
Invulnerability

Procedural errors

Intentional
noncompliance

Macho; Antiauthority

Procedural errors

Intentional
noncompliance

Anti-authority;
Invulnerability

Procedural errors

Intentional
noncompliance

Anti-authority;
Invulnerability
Anti-authority;
Invulnerability

Procedural error
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Procedural
error
Procedural
error

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
An analysis of archival data was used to determine if behavioral traps exist in the
multi-crew environment. The initial portion of this study was accomplished using a
qualitative approach including SMEs to explore the behavioral traps of 14 CFR Part 121
accidents. The archives were the NTSB AARs. The latter portion of this study used a
quantitative approach to examine the relationships between the behavioral traps and the
selected variables such as age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, certification
level, and time of day.

Research Approach
This study utilized archival research methods to explore the behavioral traps
contributing to flight crew accidents. This research drew from the population of 34
NTSB U.S. aviation accidents attributed to flight crew error from 1991 to 2013.
Accident reports were used to explore exclusively commercial Part 121 flight crewrelated accidents. In addition, once the behavioral traps were described and understood,
several correlations were conducted to explore the relationships between the behavioral
traps and the factors surrounding the aviation accidents, such as the captain’s age, the
captain’s flight experience, the first officer’s age, the first officer’s flight experience, the
first officer’s certification level, weather, flight conditions, and the time of day.
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Population
The primary data source was the NTSB AARs and NTSB factual reports. The
AARs and factual reports contained the information needed to explore the underlying
human error issues surrounding the unsafe pilot behaviors, that is, the behavioral traps
contributing to the aviation accidents. Purposive, also known as judgmental, sampling
was used to study only those NTSB accident reports where flight crew error was a causal
factor.
There are various reasons for selecting the time frame specified. First, beyond
1991, the NTSB has consistently generated factual reports in its analysis of aviation
accidents. Second, the years 1991 to 2013 were selected because the vast majority of the
factual reports had already been upgraded from preliminary to final status. The accident
reports were downloaded from ERAU’s website collection of NTSB AARs. Then, these
reports were analyzed for evidence of behavioral traps. Third, beginning in 1991, CRM
training had been established successfully at most U.S. airlines and was maturing
(Helmreich et al., 1999). An analysis of behavioral traps during this period, albeit to a
very limited degree, (indirectly) highlighted successes or shortcomings with such a
training program.

Sources of the Data
The data collected from the NTSB had to conform to the following criteria: U.S.
14 CFR Part 121 airline accidents that were partly or wholly attributed to flight crew
error. In addition, the accident must have involved death, serious injury, or substantial
damage to the aircraft.
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Excluded from consideration were accidents that were classified as having
undetermined causes and those that were attributed to sabotage, suicide, or criminal
activity such as hijacking. Accidents attributed to maintenance issues are only included if
improper crew decisions contributed to the accident.

Data Collection
A team composed of four certified flight instructors (CFIs) served as SMEs and
coded the data. These SMEs had either a commercial or an airline transport pilot (ATP)
certificate. The possession of a flight instructor certificate and either a commercial or
ATP certificate ensured that all SMEs have (1) been exposed to commercial operations
and (2) taught the concepts of hazardous attitudes and behavioral traps to students. All
SMEs became thoroughly familiar with the behavioral traps by receiving the necessary
instruction on these unsafe pilot behaviors before the data were coded and analyzed.
Familiarization training and evaluation sessions included case studies with examples of
behavioral traps categorization techniques (please see Appendix C – Ground
Lesson/Familiarization Training on Behavioral Traps). The use of three examples
assisted the SMEs when identifying the behavioral traps and the underlying human error
issues surrounding them. The SMEs used a subset of the FAA-defined list of behavioral
traps to classify the unsafe pilot behaviors. After training, the aircraft accidents were
randomly assigned to the SMEs such that at least two different SMEs independently
analyzed each accident.
Using the narrative data obtained from the NTSB as the first step into the
analysis, the SMEs used the AARs and Factual Reports to assemble a chain of events for
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each accident. It was necessary for both SMEs to agree on what constituted an event, the
sequence of events, the pilot actions associated with those events, and how the events
affected decision making and CRM. Next, the SMEs examined the reports for evidence
of pilot actions related to behavioral traps. Again, both SMEs had to agree on what
constituted a pilot action and if that action was reflective of a behavioral trap. Any
incongruities among the SMEs were dealt with through integrative sessions. These
sessions allowed ideas and notes to be cross-compared with the other SME that shared
the same NTSB report. This final act led to new observations and/or linkages which
resulted in revisions in the data collection process.
During the identification and classification of the unsafe pilot behaviors, the
SMEs used a list of descriptors (see Appendix C – Ground Lesson or SME
Familiarization Training). Some behavioral traps, as defined by the FAA, presented
challenges to the coding team. Jeppesen (2014) categorized the behavioral traps as
instrument operating, commercial operating, or single-pilot/general aviation operational
pitfalls. For the purposes of studying the behavioral traps in the airline environment, only
the instrument and commercial traps were considered because all Part 121 operations are
conducted on IFR flight plans. In addition, Loss of Situational Awareness and Getting
Behind the Aircraft were combined into one behavioral trap. The analysis of behavioral
traps in this study used the Jeppesen process. Lastly, there are two behavioral traps that
apply to aircraft being operated on instruments: Duck-Under Syndrome and Descending
Below the MEA. For the purposes of this study, these two behavioral traps were
combined into a new classification termed Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude.
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The goal of this research project was to discover what behavioral traps may exist
in the Part 121 accident world. Although the behavioral traps were used as a priori
codes, the coding process of the SMEs included the thorough review of each NTSB
report for key text identifying operational errors that led to the behavioral traps
themselves. The NTSB reports were independently coded and subsequently crosschecked to develop consistency in coding (inter-rater consensus).
A tally sheet (see appendix B) was used to gather the necessary information from
the SMEs. This information includes the coding of behavioral traps and other
surrounding factors or variables of the aviation accident such as crew age, weather, and
flight conditions. The coded text passages within the NTSB document, although done
manually by the pilot experts, was subsequently entered into a qualitative data analysis
software called QSR NVivo.

Treatment of the Data
The treatment of the data included descriptive statistics demonstrating the
prevalence of each behavioral trap across the aviation accidents and the most prominent
contributing factors, as well. However, with NVivo, the data transitioned beyond
descriptions of the coded text to an analysis of associations, comparisons, and pattern
identifications. Comparing and contrasting the data may reveal systems, relationships,
and processes that could not be discovered in the manual coding stage. This type of
analysis within NVivo is called relational analysis. When investigating relational
patterns, the researchers explore specific connections between pairs of codes in the data,
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some by building a data narrative, and others by examining relationships between
categories within the data (Bazeley, 2013).
Relationships between the variables were examined through several correlations,
one of which was a point-biserial correlation calculated within SPSS. According to Field
(2009), a point-biserial correlation coefficient rpb examines the relationship between a
continuous variable that is a discrete dichotomy (e.g., yes or no, dead or alive). The other
statistical test performed was a Phi correlation. A Phi correlation is used when both
variables are categorical and each variable has only two categories (2009). Correlation
matrices will demonstrate the relationships between the variables under study.

Reliability and Validity of the Data
To assess the quality of the qualitative portion of a study, researchers may employ
four tests named: credibility, dependability, transferability, and compatibility (Lincoln &
Guba, 1985). Some of these tests were more applicable to this archival design than
others.
Credibility refers to accuracy; the descriptions of the events or aviation accidents
and antecedents must be plausible and recognizable. Credibility was achieved by
including other investigators in the study, namely the SMEs.
Dependability is more suited to interviews or observational research and refers to
the extent to which another researcher, with similar training and rapport with participants,
makes the same observations. Although not entirely applicable to archival studies, the
SMEs still cross-checked their coding process against each other and, in similar fashion,
gained dependability.
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Transferability refers to the generalizability of the study findings to other settings,
populations, and context. This test of quality is usually one weakness of studies
involving qualitative methods; however, sufficient details regarding methodology
procedures allow readers to assess this. Transferability is akin to external validity. The
interpretations and conclusions of this study could be applicable to most U.S. air carrier
environments resulting in good external validity (Creswell, 2005).
Finally, confirmability refers to the objectivity of the data, or how much another
researcher agrees with the meaning of the data. This was achieved by three methods: (1)
a team – all SMEs – coded and categorized the narratives of the NTSB reports, (2) the
SMEs had a coding scheme from which to work, and (3) the SMEs reconciled any
differences found during the coding process by comparing their work against each other.
The behavioral traps are well defined and well-known FAA terms. The NTSB
accident reports offered an accessible account that included facts, findings of causal
factors, and recommendations. The focus of this research was on the human (pilot)
experience as recorded by the NTSB accounts; the archives provided deep insights that
were not possible with quantitative methods. The SMEs all had similar backgrounds (see
Appendix D) as professional pilots and flight instructors and were exposed, through flight
experience and professional training, to the concepts of unsafe behaviors by pilots.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The purpose of this study was to examine the pilot behavioral traps in the multicrew Part 121 air carrier environment. That is, what was the nature of their occurrence
and with what regularity they happened in the airline domain. Another key component of
this study was to explore the relationships between the behavioral traps and other factors
such as age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and the first officer
certification level.
Four SMEs analyzed 34 NTSB accident reports. These accidents conformed to
the purpose of analyzing reports where flight crew error was a causal or contributing
factor between 1991and 2013. During the qualitative analysis, various themes began to
emerge which played significant roles in many accidents. These topics were airline
management, CRM issues, fatigue, and a former behavioral trap called Flying Outside the
Envelope. A discussion of these developing themes is also included in this section. The
qualitative component of the SMEs’ reports was uploaded into NVivo while the
numerical data were analyzed with SPSS.

Descriptive Statistics
As described in the previous section, for each case, the assigned SMEs
determined which behavioral traps were present. Every SME found a minimum of one
behavioral trap and a maximum of four throughout the analysis. The average number of
behavioral traps was two (M = 2.0) with a standard deviation of 0.60 (SD = .6). In
addition, during the coding process the researcher asked the SMEs to identify actions
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representative of the behavioral traps and any contributing factors that may have
influenced the outcome of the flight. Figure 1 shows the frequency with which the
behavioral traps were present in all the aviation accidents. Figure 2 displays the most
prevalent traps in fatal accidents.

Behavioral Traps Total
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

LSA

Neg

PP

Get

Figure 1. Frequency count of all behavioral traps found.

Figure 2. Behavioral traps in fatal accidents only.
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Des

The behavioral traps of Loss of Situational Awareness and Neglect of Flight
Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists were overwhelmingly dominant, even
throughout the fatal accidents. Peer Pressure, Get-There-Itis, and Descent Below an IFR
Altitude were each found in six accident reports or fewer.
Aviation accidents are generally the result of a series of simultaneous or
consecutive circumstances that each add operational risk; seldom is a single isolated
cause identified. During the analysis of the coding process performed by the SMEs,
various themes began to emerge which played significant roles in many accidents. These
topics were airline management, CRM issues, fatigue, and a former behavioral trap called
Flying Outside the Envelope. This latter trap was left out of the current study due to
Jeppesen’s (2014) categorization of the behavioral traps among commercial, instrumentrated, and general aviation pilots. However, during training, the SMEs were alerted to
the existence of all behavioral traps and were told to flag them if they saw their presence
among Part 121 pilots. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these contributory factors.

Contributing Factors
Airline = 16
CRM issues = 31
Envelope = 9
Fatigue = 7

Figure 3. Other contributing factors in connection with the Part 121 accidents.
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As indicated earlier, the purpose of the study was to look for associations between
the behavioral traps and many other factors such as age, flight experience, weather, flight
conditions, time of day, and the first officer (FO) certification level. Of the 34 accidents,
14 occurred during the day and 20 at night; also 16 were under VMC conditions, and 18
were IMC. In ten of the accidents, the FO had the Commercial Certificate, and 24 had
the ATP. In 22 of the accidents, weather was a factor. This value includes those
accidents occurring within IMC. Table 7 provides descriptive information about FO’s
and captains’ ages. Much of this numerical data were found in the NTSB’s factual
reports of the accidents.

Table 7
Numerical Data on Captains and First Officers (FOs)
Variable
Captain Age
Captain Experience
FO Age
FO Experience

Minimum Maximum
27
2,500
24
1,800

59
23,000
56
17,744

Mean
48.06
11,812.97
38.06
6617.24

Standard
Deviation
8.60
5976.72
7.91
4571.62

Reliability Testing
So that the SMEs could record information more beneficial to the study, Table 4 a
data collection instrument was not employed. Instead, a tally sheet (see Appendix B)
allowed the SMEs to record their thoughts and data. To assess the quality of the
qualitative portion of a study, four tests were used: credibility, dependability,
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transferability, and compatibility (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Some of these tests were
more applicable to this archival research design than others.
Credibility refers to accuracy; the descriptions of the events or aviation accidents
and antecedents must be plausible and recognizable. Credibility was achieved by
including other investigators in the study, namely the SMEs instead of having the main
researcher describe the events.
Dependability is more suited to interviews or observational research and refers to
the extent to which another researcher, with similar training and rapport with participants,
makes the same observations. Although not entirely applicable to the current archival
study, the SMEs were able to cross-check their coding process against each other and, in
similar fashion, gain dependability.
Transferability refers to the generalizability of the study findings to other settings,
populations, and context. This test of quality is usually one weakness of studies
involving qualitative methods; however, sufficient detail regarding methodology
procedures will allow readers to assess this. Transferability is akin to external validity.
The interpretations and conclusions of this study could be applicable to most U.S. air
carrier environments resulting in good external validity (Creswell, 2005).
Finally, confirmability refers to the objectivity of the data, how much another
researcher agrees with the meaning of the data. This was achieved by three methods: (1)
a team – all SMEs –coded and categorized the narratives of the NTSB reports, (2) the
SMEs used a coding scheme learned during their training (see Appendix C), and (3)
through integrative sessions, the SMEs reconciled any differences found during the
coding process by comparing their work against each other. The behavioral traps are
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well defined and well-known FAA terms. The NTSB accidents reports offered an
accessible account that included facts, findings of causal factors, and recommendations.
The SMEs all had similar backgrounds (see Appendix D) as professional pilots and flight
instructors and had been exposed, through flight experience and/or professional training,
to the concepts of unsafe behaviors by pilots.

Hypothesis Testing
The study examined the relationships between the pilot behavioral traps and
factors such as age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and first
officer certification level. Because of the low sample size, N = 34, and consequently low
statistical power, any significance below the .10 (p value level) will be highlighted. The
research hypotheses, listed below, stated that there was a relationship among the
behavioral traps and the factors mentioned above. The null hypotheses stated that there
were no relationships between the factors previously mentioned and the behavioral traps.
The following subsections list each hypothesis accompanied by the statistical result for
each variable to determine whether or not the hypotheses can be rejected.
H01: The null hypothesis stated that there is no relationship between a captain’s
age and the behavioral traps. The statistical test performed was a Point-biserial
correlation. The results are as follows:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness, correlation r = -.19, p = .29
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists,
correlation, r = .11, p = .55
c) Peer Pressure, correlation, r = .09, p = .59
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d) Get-There-Itis, correlation, r = .09, p = .63
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, correlation, r = -.25, p = .16
All statistical results report p values greater than .05 and .10. Therefore, all of the
null hypotheses failed to be rejected. No relationships were found between the captain’s
age and the behavioral traps.
H02: The null hypothesis stated that there is no relationship between a captain’s
flight experience (hours flown) and the behavioral traps. The statistical test performed
was a Point-biserial correlation. The results were:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness, correlation, r = -.20, p = .26
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists, correlation,
r = .13, p = .46
c) Peer Pressure, correlation, r = .11, p = .54
d) Get-There-Itis, correlation, r = .18, p = .31
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, correlation, r = -.34, p = .05
With the exception of Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, all statistical
results report a p value greater than .05. Therefore, the null hypothesis, stating there was
no relationship between the captain’s flight experience and the behavioral traps of Loss
of Situational Awareness; Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and
Checklists; Peer Pressure; and Get-There-Itis failed to be rejected. The relationship
between the captain’s flight experience and Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude
approached significance and could be investigated further.

76

H03: The null hypothesis stated that there is no relationship between a first
officer’s age and the behavioral traps. The statistical test performed was a Point-biserial
correlation. The results are as follows:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness, correlation, r = -.06, p = .98
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists, correlation,
r = .10, p = .60
c) Peer Pressure, correlation, r = -.17, p = .36
d) Get-There-Itis, correlation, r = .09, p = .97
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, correlation, r = -.12, p = .50
All statistical results report p values greater than .05 and .10. Therefore, all of the
null hypotheses failed to be rejected. No relationships were found between the FO’s age
and the behavioral traps.
H04: The null hypothesis stated that there is no relationship between a first
officer’s flight experience (hours flown) and the behavioral traps. The statistical test
performed was a Point-biserial correlation. The results were:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness, correlation, r = -.07, p = .69
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists, correlation,
r = .13, p = .47
c) Peer Pressure, correlation, r = -.18, p = .31
d) Get-There-Itis, correlation, r = .00, p = .99
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, correlation, r = -.27, p = .12
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All statistical results report a p value greater than .05 and .10. Therefore, all of
the null hypotheses failed to be rejected. No relationships were found between the FO’s
flight experience and the behavioral traps.
H05: The null hypotheses stated that there is no relationship between a first
officer’s certification level (commercial versus airline transport pilot) and the behavioral
traps. The statistical test performed was a Phi correlation. The results are as follows:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness, correlation, r = -.05, p = .76
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists, correlation,
r = .01, p = .96
c) Peer Pressure, correlation, r = .21, p = .22
d) Get-There-Itis, correlation, r = .10, p = .59
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, correlation, r = -.09, p = .62
All statistical results report p values greater than .05 and .10. Therefore, all of the
null hypotheses failed to be rejected. No relationships were found between the FO’s
certification level and the behavioral traps.
H06: The null hypothesis stated that there is no relationship between inclement
weather and the behavioral traps. The statistical test performed was a Phi correlation.
The results were:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness, correlation, r = -.16, p = .35
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists, correlation,
r = -.07, p = .68
c) Peer Pressure, correlation, r = .18, p = .29
d) Get-There-Itis, correlation, r = -.41, p = .81
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e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, correlation, r = .31, p = .07
All statistical results report a p value greater than .05. Therefore, all of the null
hypotheses failed to be rejected. However, the relationship between Weather and the
behavioral trap called Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude was significant at the
p < .10 level. This significance level was expected due to the fact that IFR minimum
altitudes are only used when inclement weather is required to approach an airport.
Therefore, no significant relationships were found between the inclement weather and the
behavioral traps.
H07: The null hypothesis stated that there is no relationship between flight
conditions (IMC versus VMC) and the behavioral traps. The statistical test performed
was a Phi correlation. The results are as follows:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness, correlation, r = -.17, p = .35
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists, correlation,
r = -.43, p = .80
c) Peer Pressure, correlation, r = .13, p = .46
d) Get-There-Itis, correlation, r = .06, p = .73
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, correlation, r = .39, p < .05.
With the exception of Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, all statistical
results report a p value greater than .05 and greater than .10. Therefore, the null
hypotheses stating there was no relationship between flight conditions (VMC versus
IMC) and the behavioral traps of Loss of Situational Awareness; Neglect of Flight
Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists; Peer Pressure; and Get-There-Itis failed
to be rejected. The relationship between flight conditions and Unauthorized Descent
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Below an IFR Altitude was likely to be significant because flight crews are expected to
always conduct an instrument approach when weather conditions are IMC. Minimum
IFR altitudes are only published for instrument approaches. In other words, pilots will
proceed to the airport by the exclusive use of their instruments and not visually.
H08: The null hypothesis stated that there is no relationship between time of day
(day versus night) and the behavioral traps. The statistical test performed was a Phi
correlation. The results are as follows:
a) Loss of Situational Awareness, correlation, r = -.10, p = .57
b) Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists, correlation,
r = .31, p = .07
c) Peer Pressure, correlation, r = -.24, p = .16
d) Get-There-Itis, correlation, r = .10, p = .95
e) Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, correlation, r = .18, p = .29
All statistical results report a p value greater than .05. However, the relationship
between Time of Day and the behavioral trap called Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and Checklists was significant at the p < .10 level. To investigate further, a
search was begun to verify the distribution of the behavioral trap known as Neglect of
Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists in accidents during the day versus
the night. Out of the 27 accidents where this behavioral trap was found, nine of them
occurred during the day while 18 happened at night. This indicates that this behavioral
trap occurred twice as much during night flights. Figure 4 presents a pie chart to better
understand the relationship between Time of Day and Neglect of Flight Planning,
Preflight Inspections, and Checklists.
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Neglect of Flight
Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and
Checklists.
Day = 9
Night = 18

Figure 4. Occurrences of the behavioral trap called Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and Checklists and Time of Day (day versus night).

No statistical result approached significance at the .05 level. Therefore, all of the
null hypotheses failed to be rejected. No significant relationships were found between
the time of day (day versus night) and the behavioral traps.
As indicated earlier, there was a correlation, r = -.34, p = .05, between the
Captain’s Flight Experience and the behavioral trap known as Unauthorized Descent
Below an IFR Altitude. To explore further, a new variable combining both the
experience of the Captain and First Officer was created. With this new variable called
Collective Flight Experience (expressed as the sum of both crewmembers’ flight time) a
significant and stronger relationship was found, r = -.35, p < .05. Although this
hypothesis was not presented at the beginning of the study, it was a variable worthy of
additional examination because airlines could be interested in understanding how the
combined experience of their flight crewmembers may relate to descending below
minimums during an instrument approach in bad weather conditions. No other
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correlations were found to be significant between all the variables studied and the
behavioral traps.
Figure 5 shows a bar graph that allows the reader to visualize this relationship by
comparing the average or mean Flight experience (in hours) of the captains who
descended below the IFR altitude without authorization to those who did not fall into this
behavioral trap. The mean was 7,028 hours for those captains who did descend below
versus the mean of 12,638 flight hours of those captains who did not.

Figure 5. Bar graph comparing the flight experience (hours) means between captains
who do not descend below an IFR altitude and captains that do exhibit this behavioral
trap.

Figure 6 accomplishes the same data treatment with the new variable of collective
flight experience. The flight experience mean of crews that do not descend below the
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IFR altitude was 19,762, whereas the mean (flight hours) of those crewmembers that
exhibited this behavioral trap was 10,703.

Figure 6. Bar graph comparing the collective flight experience (hours) means between
flight crews who do not descend below an IFR altitude and crews that do exhibit this
behavioral trap.

Table 8 summarizes the means and standard deviations for both variables, that is,
Captain’s Flight Experience and Collective Flight Experience and the behavioral trap
called Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude. Table 9 presents the means and
standard deviations of captains’ and first officers’ flight experiences for all other
behavioral traps. Finally, Table 10 summarizes all statistical results for easy viewing.
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations for Flight Experience of Captains and Collective Flight
Experience and the Behavioral Trap of Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude

Variable
Captain Experience
Collective Experience

Yes
Unauthorized Descent
Below an IFR Altitude
M = 7, 028 hours,
SD = 3,172 hours
M = 10,703 hours,
SD = 2,910 hours

No
Unauthorized Descent
Below an IFR Altitude
M = 12,637 hours,
SD = 5,989 hours
M = 19,762 hours,
SD = 9,455hours

Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations for Flight Experience (Hours) of Captains and First
Officers (FO) and All Other Behavioral Traps

Variable
Yes
Loss of Situational Awareness
No
Loss of Situational Awareness
Yes
Neglect of Flight Planning,
Preflight Inspections, and
Checklists
No
Neglect of Flight Planning,
Preflight Inspections, and
Checklists
Yes
Peer Pressure
No
Peer Pressure
Yes
Get-There-Itis
No
Get-There-Itis

Captain
Experience
M = 11, 107 hours,
SD = 6,270 hours
M = 13, 773 hours,
SD = 4,851 hours

First Officer
Experience
M = 7, 153 hours,
SD = 4,485 hours
M = 6, 912 hours,
SD = 4,829 hours

M = 12, 203 hours,
SD = 6,026 hours

M = 7, 028 hours,
SD = 3,172 hours

M = 10, 308 hours,
SD = 5,982 hours

M = 5, 878 hours,
SD = 3,462 hours

M = 13, 216 hours,
SD = 6,667 hours
M = 11, 512 hours,
SD = 5,907 hours
M = 14, 375 hours,
SD = 6,987 hours
M = 11, 371 hours,
SD = 5,809 hours

M = 4, 880 hours,
SD = 4,117 hours
M = 6, 989 hours,
SD = 4,647 hours
M = 6, 649 hours,
SD = 5,464 hours
M = 6, 611 hours,
SD = 4,512 hours
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Table 10 shows a summary table of all statistical results for easy viewing. These
statistical results include the Point-biserial and the Phi correlations.

Table 10
Summary of the Relationships Between Behavioral Traps and the Variables Studied
Neglect of
Flight
Loss of
Planning,
Variable
Situational Preflight
Awareness Inspections
, and
Checklists
Captain Age
r = -.19,
r = .11,
p = .29
p = .55
Captain Experience r = -.20,
r = .13,
p = .26
p = .46
FO Age
r = -.06,
r = .10,
p = .98
p = .60
FO Experience
r = -.07,
r = .13,
p = .69
p = .47
FO Certification
r = -.05,
r = .01,
p = .76
p = .96
Inclement Weather r = -.16,
r = -.07,
p = .34
p = .68
Flight conditions
r = -.17,
r = -.43,
p = .35
p = .80
Time of Day
r = -.10,
r = .31,
p = .57
p = .07

Peer
Pressure

Get-ThereItis

Unauthorized
Descent
Below an
IFR Altitude

r = .09,
p = .59
r = .11,
p = .54
r = -.17,
p = .36
r = -.18,
p = .31
r = .21,
p = .22
r = .18,
p = .29
r = .13,
p = .46
r = -.24,
p = .16

r = .09,
p = .63
r = .18,
p = .31
r = .09,
p = .97
r = .00,
p = .39
r = .10,
p = .57
r = -.41,
p = .81
r = .06,
p = .73
r = .10,
p = .95

r = -.25,
p = .16
r = -.34,
p = .05
r = -.12,
p = .50
r = -.27,
p = .12
r = -.09,
p = .62
r = .31,
p = .07
r = .39,
p < .05
r = .18,
p = .29

Qualitative Data
The following section describes, in comprehensive fashion, how each unsafe
behavior is manifested within pilots of the aviation accidents. For the sake of avoiding
repetition of similar pilot actions, only the most representative examples (i.e., NTSB
report passages) are illustrated for the top two behavioral traps found as well as for the
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remaining traps of Peer Pressure, Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude, and GetThere-Itis. Because an unexpected trap had a presence in Part 121 accidents, results are
also shown for the additional behavioral trap of Flying Outside the Envelope. The pilot
actions representative of the behavioral traps are illustrated using tables that are
immediately followed by word frequency queries called tags or word clouds.
A tag or word cloud is a visual representation of textual data highlighting the
importance of the most commonly used words within a source (e.g., document,
interview). Each cloud shows the most frequently used words by increasing its font size
and placing those words nearer the center of the cloud. Word or tag clouds are very
useful for quickly perceiving the most prominent term and its relative prominence
compared to others used within a source. The relative font size indicates which words
were coded most commonly throughout the sources. This last action was performed to
investigate common or emerging themes within the traps themselves and the contributory
factors that arose when the SMEs began to analyze the data.

Neglect of flight planning, preflight inspection and checklists. This trap was
found in 27 (79%) of 34 cases. A closer examination of this behavioral trap reveals that
more than one action is being accounted for. Any occasion where the pilot would
deliberately or unconsciously bypass a procedure, checklist, inspection, or flight planning
process, the SME team would code this behavior under this node within NVivo. Table
11 lists illustrations of pilot actions that exemplify Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspection, and Checklists found in the aviation accidents.
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Table 11
Examples of Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
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Accident
Report

Examples

00-02

Although the airplane speed was within the target range, the airplane did not
meet FedEx’s criteria for a stabilized approach because its rate of descent was
greater than FedEx’s recommended 1,000 feet per minute (fpm).

01-02

Continuation of the approach to a landing when the company’s max
crosswind was exceeded and use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine per
ratio after landing.

09-03

Investigation revealed that the flight crew did not perform several of the
appropriate checklists and interrupted an emergency fire-related checklist.

11-02

Had the captain complied with standard operating procedures in response to
the flap anomaly, unstabilized approach, stick shaker, and terrain awareness
and warning system warning and initiated a go around maneuver, the accident
likely would not have occurred.

91-02

Captain descended below 3,000 feet prior to establishing the airplane on final
approach course, contrary to directions on the approach plate and established
requirements.

93-02

The captain returned about 10 minutes after officer, and neither of them
performed a walk around inspection of the airplane, nor were they required to
do so by USAir procedures.

98-03

The captain told investigators that he did not call for emergency descend
checklist but said he thought he had completed all of the items from memory.

98-03

Failure to pull the cabin air shutoff T-handle, as required by the “Cabin Cargo
Smoke Light Illuminated” checklist, allowed the normal circulation of air to
continue to enter the main cargo area, thereby providing the fire with a
continuing source of oxygen and contributing to its rapid growth.

97-01

He said that a “norm” existed for the ﬁrst ofﬁcer to make hydraulic system
conﬁguration changes; he was aware that this was not standard operating
practice, which assigned the task to the pilot not ﬂying at all times. He said he
conducted his cockpit according to standard operating practice, because he
was new to the airplane, and he did not expect ﬁrst ofﬁcers to conﬁgure the
hydraulic pumps.
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95-01

The ﬂight crew deviated from standard operating procedures in a number of
signiﬁcant ways that later affected the sequence of events leading up to the
accident. Speciﬁcally, they delayed starting the second engine contrary to
COA requirements to taxi on two engines during conditions that require the
use of engine anti-ice. The deviation contributed to their being rushed during
ﬁnal preparations for takeoff. They failed to use the Delayed Engine Start
Checklist, missed items on several other checklists, and did not called
checklist complete.

07-05

The abbreviated brieﬁng was contrary to company policy, and the Safety
Board notes that it is prudent for pilots to fully conduct taxi brieﬁngs
according to standard operating procedures.

08-02

The ﬁrst ofﬁcer stated that he thought that pilots were required to (and
should) check landing distances with a contaminated runway. He said that he
believed 4,000 feet was the required landing distance but indicated that they
did not check the landing distance charts.

10-01

The reason the ﬁrst ofﬁcer retracted the ﬂaps and suggested raising the gear
could not be determined from the available information, these actions were
inconsistent with company stall recovery procedures and training.

91-02

“I'll just do a quick procedure turn headed back in, so I'm not going to
straighten out on the thing, the localizer, just teardrop and come right back
around and land.” The FO simply responded “OK”.

94-06

The captain actively moved the power levers from the flight idle gate into the
beta range for undetermined reasons. Operation of the propellers in the beta
range while in flight is prohibited by the airplane flight manual.

06-01

About 1912:02, the captain transmitted a burp over the ARTCC radio
frequency that would have been heard by other pilots and air traffic
controllers. An unknown voice on the radio frequency responded to the
captain’s burp, stating, “nice tone,” and the CVR recorded the accident pilot’s
chuckling. About 1912:53, the captain talked about deliberately dropping a
flight manual on a passenger whose foot had intruded into the cockpit. The
first officer engaged in banter with the captain, and both pilots used informal,
nonstandard terminology during the flight.
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08-01

During a post-accident interview, the first officer stated that he and the
captain did the “mental math” for a 3° glideslope and that, on the basis of this
calculation, they assumed that the glideslope was functioning normally. The
captain further stated that the cockpit instrumentation showed the airplane on
the glideslope with no warning flags. Regardless, the flight crew should not
have disregarded the information provided by the controller and on the ATIS
information broadcasts about the glideslope being unusable and should have
used the localizer minimums for the approach.

96-07

The captain was not authorized under the COM to allow the first officer to fly
the airplane. The captain told investigators that he was not familiar with the
section of the COM that indicated that he was not supposed to share flying
duties with the first officer.

Figure 7 shows a frequency query tag cloud illustrating the prominence of specific
words within the sources analyzed: NTSB AARs and NTSB factual reports. The most
frequently used words for this behavioral trap were captain, airplane, procedures,
approach, and checklist.

Figure 7. Tag cloud helps visualize word query for Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and Checklists.
90

Table 12
Examples of Peer Pressure
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Accident
Report

Examples

94-01

Fifty feet, the first officer stated, “I’m gonna go around.” The captain stated,
“No, no, no I got it” The first officer responded, “You got the airplane” As
the first officer said the world “airplane”. The automatic voice said “thirty”.
The captain took control and landed the airplane.

11-02

Following the application of power, the airspeed began increasing. At
0435:40, the first officer asked, “should I go around,” and the captain replied,
“no,” and then stated, “keep descending.”

91-05

The captain became overly reliant on the first officer. This contributed to the
runway incursion. The captain knew there was something wrong, he even
questioned but acknowledged the FO’s instructions.

06-01

After hearing the weather observation, the captain commented, “we’re not
getting in...we don’t have an ILS [instrument landing system].” The ﬁrst
ofﬁcer responded, “I know...go all this [expletive] way. Well, let’s try it.” The
captain responded, “yeah, we’ll try it.” About 30 seconds later, the captain
said, “I don’t want to...go all the way out here for nothing tonight,” and
moments later said, “I’ll be so happy when we have an ILS everywhere we
go.” The ﬁrst ofﬁcer concurred, and the captain continued, “I thought we
were gonna have it easy tonight.”

97-01

The ﬁrst ofﬁcer told Safety Board investigators that his goal after recognizing
that the ﬂaps were not extended was to get the captain to initiate a go-around.
Thirty seconds before touchdown, the ﬁrst ofﬁcer stated “want to take it
around?” and the captain replied “no that’s alright. * keep your speed up here
about uh.” When the captain denied the ﬁrst ofﬁcer’s request to go around
and told him to keep his speed up, the ﬁrst ofﬁcer did not challenge the
captain’s statement. He also did not question the captain to determine his
reason(s) for continuing the approach. The ﬁrst ofﬁcer stated that there was
no time for discussion with the captain because the approach was so fast. The
ﬁrst ofﬁcer’s failure to question the captain’s decision to continue the
approach was inconsistent with the CRM training he had received that
emphasized the importance of sharing doubts with other crewmembers and
quickly resolving conﬂicts.

95-03

During the course of performing the missed approach procedure, the first
officer acted, without challenge, to a command from the captain to “down,
push it down.”
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Figure 8 shows a frequency query tag cloud illustrating the prominence of specific
words within the sources analyzed. For Peer Pressure, the most frequently coded words
were captain, first, officer, stated, and airplane.

Figure 8. Tag cloud helps visualize word query for Peer Pressure.

Get-There-Itis. This trap is known in some textbooks and official FAA
documents, as Get-home-itis. During Get-There-Itis the pilot’s pressure comes from
within (i.e., him/herself), and the obstinacy is specifically related to arriving at the
destination. Table 13 lists the several illustrative instances of Get-There-Itis. This
behavioral trap was found in 5 (15%) of 34 cases.
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Table 13
Examples of Get-There-Itis
Accident
Report

Examples

01-02

The cockpit voice recorder indicated that flight crew had discussed the
weather and the needed to expedite the Approach. The captain stated “we got
to get over there quick.”

95-01

The pilots failed to conduct a prestart checklist properly and, subsequently,
failed to observe the illuminated light on the annunciator panel. A second
opportunity to detect the status of the pitot heat knob was the annunciator
panel check just before takeoff. In this case, the ﬁrst ofﬁcer called checklist
items without the captain’s request and without using normal challenge and
response procedures as the airplane was being taxied into position for takeoff.
The pilots appeared to be rushed, and there is no evidence that the ﬁrst ofﬁcer
actually observed the annunciator panel.

94-06

The captain stated “man we’re almost the speed of heat here, two sixty four
or two sixty three… sixty two” he said “gosh, we gonna come down.”

94-01

The flight crew ignored the present weather conditions and continued the
approach to land even during the unestablished approach, the Captain took
the flight controls at the last moment when it was too late to correct or
execute a go around.

05-02

The Captain fixated on landing the airplane with a disregard for any
alternative course of action such as performing a go-around.

Figure 9 shows that the most frequently coded words for this behavioral trap were
captain, flight, airplane, crew, approach, weather, and landing.
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Figure 9. Word frequency tag cloud for Get-There-Itis.

Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude. This trap was found in 5 (15%)
of 34 reports. A combination of previously named behavioral traps Descent below the
MEA and Duck-under Syndrome, the concept is evidenced when a pilot descends below
minimum altitudes during en route flight or an approach before obtaining visual contact
with the environment, either due to a belief that there is a built-in margin of error in every
approach procedure, or a refusal to admit that the landing cannot be safely accomplished
and a missed approach must be initiated. Table 14 highlights several illustrations of pilot
actions that exemplify Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude.
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Table 14
Examples of Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude
Accident
Report
14-02
91-02

06-01

08-01

96-05

Examples
The airplane continued to descend at 1,500 fpm and passed through and
continued below the desired glidepath.
Captain descended below 3,000 feet prior to establishing the airplane on final
approach course, contrary to directions on the approach plate and establish
requirements […] captain did not have the runway environment in sight when
he told the first officer to continue the approach.
The captain, while acting as pilot ﬂying, descended below the MDA after
supposedly having the approach lights in sight. The airplane struck trees and
crashed just short of the runway
The MDA for the localizer (glideslope out) approach to runway 28 was 429
feet agl. No CVR evidence or post-accident interview information indicated
that either crewmember had the runway environment in sight by that altitude.
The captain initially did not recognize the descent below MDA, and he failed
to react immediately when he was alerted to the altitude deviation by the first
officer.

Figure 10 demonstrates the most frequency coded words within this behavioral
trap. These words were airplane, MDA, approach, captain, descended, and runway.

Figure 10. Word frequency tag cloud for Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude.
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Loss of Situational Awareness. This trap was found in 25 (74%) of 34 cases.
The FAA (2009) explains that, in extreme cases, when a pilot gets behind the aircraft, a
loss of positional or situational awareness may result. The pilot may not know the
aircraft’s geographical location, or may be unable to recognize deteriorating
circumstances. Coding this behavior under this node within NVivo involved recognizing
any signs of spatial, geographic, operational, or procedural disorientation. Situational
awareness includes the full appreciation of not only the aircraft’s physical position in
space and time but the correct procedures and the ability to plan appropriate responses to
the real aircraft situation. Table 15 shows some of the most illustrative examples of Loss
of Situational Awareness.

Table 15
Examples of Loss of Situational Awareness

The tag cloud represented by Figure 11 shows that the most frequently coded
words during the analysis were captain, airplane, approach, first, and officer.
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Accident
Report
04-02

04-02
04-04

05-01

01-02

05-02

05-02
11-02

91-05

91-05

93-02

94-01

Examples
The first officer’s performance was deficient in ways that appear inconsistent
with characterizations of his past performance, including his failure to request
flaps 30 until he was prompted to do so by the captain, his failure to say
higher on the approach, his failure to maintain appropriate engine EPR
settings during the approach, and his failure to respond to PAPI guidance that
indicated the airplane was extremely low on the approach.
The first officer flew a concave approach, with a steeper than normal initial
descend, which is characteristic of a black hole approach.
Investigation determined that pilots have generally had little exposure to, and
therefore may not fully understand, the effect of large rudder pedals inputs in
normal flight or the mechanism by which rudder deflections induce roll on a
transport category airplane.
First officer’s failure to properly apply crosswind landing techniques to align
the airplane with the runway centerline and to properly arrest the airplane’s
rate of descend (flare) before the airplane touched down.
An unidentified voice in the cockpit stated, “a…. we’ are off course.” In a
post-accident interview, the first officer stated that he thought the airplane
was stabilized until about 400 feet above the field elevation, at which point
the airplane drifted to the right.
A review of the first officer’s medical record from his personal psychiatrist
revealed that, in July 2001, he began seeing the psychiatrist for treatment of
various anxiety-related symptoms. The psychiatrist prescribed alprazolam to
treat the first officer condition. Common side effects of alprazolam include
drowsiness and light-headedness.
The captain failed to take control of the airplane when he notices the incorrect
approach procedures form the First Officer.
Flight crew’s failure to monitor and maintain a minimum safe airspeed while
executing an instrument approach in icing conditions, which resulted in an
aerodynamic stall at low altitude.
About ½ minute later, the first officer stated, “guess we turn here.” When the
captain expressed some doubt about this left turn, the first officer replied,
“Near as I can tell. Man, I can’t see out here.”
A lack of proper crew coordination, including a virtual reversal of roles by
the DC9 pilots, which led to their failure to stop taxing their airplane and alert
ground controller of their positional uncertainty in a timely manner before
and after intruding onto the active runway.
He believed that the snow had “all but stopped” and was more concerned
about the amount of vehicular traffic, such as sweepers and plows, than he
was about the snowfall.
The flight crew ignored the present weather conditions and continued the
approach to land even during the unestablished approach, the Captain took
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06-01

97-03

97-01

06-03

10-01

92-05

01-02

06-03
91-09

the flight controls at the last moment when was too late to correct or execute
a go around.
Captain asked, “what do you think?,” and the ﬁrst ofﬁcer responded, “I can’t
see [expletive].” About 2 seconds later, as the airplane continued to descend,
the captain stated, “yeah, oh there it is. Approach lights in sight.” Almost
immediately, the GPWS annunciated “two hundred” feet.
The captain gradually reduced the engine power because he perceived a need
to slightly increase the airplane’s rate of descent; however, the descent rate
increased beyond what the captain likely intended to command.
According to the ﬁrst ofﬁcer, the captain reached up to the overhead panel as
the GPWS was alerting. The captain did not recall doing this and stated that
he had interpreted the GPWS alerts as a high sink rate warning. The Captain
decided to continue to land from an unstable approach without realizing the
gear was up and ﬂaps were up. The result was a wheels up landing at the
Houston airport.
About 1 minute later, the ﬁrst ofﬁcer stated, “something’s messed up with
this thing,” and, at 0039:07, he asked “why is this thing?” At 0041:21, the
ﬁrst ofﬁcer stated that the control wheel felt “funny.” He added, “feels like I
need a lot of force. It is pushing to the right for some reason. I don’t know
why...I don’t know what’s going on.” The ﬁrst ofﬁcer then repeated twice
that it felt like he needed “a lot of force.” The CVR did not record the captain
responding to any of these comments.
The reason the captain did not recognize the impending onset of the stick
shaker could not be determined from the available evidence but that the ﬁrst
ofﬁcer’s tasks at the time the low-speed cue was visible would have likely
reduced opportunities for her timely recognition of the impending event; the
failure of both pilots to detect this situation was the result of a signiﬁcant
breakdown in their monitoring responsibilities and workload management.
Failure of the crew to recognize and recover from an unusual attitude after
experiencing spatial disorientation or an attitude indicator failure during the
second missed approach.
The first officer asked the captain whether he wanted to accept "a short
approach" and "keep it in tight." The captain answered, "yeah, if you see the
runway 'cause I don't quite see it." The first officer stated, "yeah, it's right
here, see it?" The captain replied, "you just point me in the right direction
and I'll start slowing down here."
The flight crew did not monitor the fuel quantity gauges or respond properly
to the airplane’s changing handling characteristics.
Flight crew's failure to detect and remove ice contamination from the wings
was a causal factor in this accident.
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Figure 11. Word frequency tag cloud for Loss of Situational Awareness.

Flying Outside the Envelope. Flying Outside the Envelope can range from the
pilot assuming an inappropriate level of performance capability of a particular aircraft,
intentionally exceeding aircraft limits assuming there is a margin of safety built into the
aircraft, or an overestimation of the pilot’s flying skills that causes the flight to exceed the
aircraft’s structural and/or aerodynamic limits. In any case, the pilot allows or causes the
aircraft to exceed its design limits. See Table 16 for occurrences of this behavioral trap
which was found in 7 (21%) of 34 accidents.
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Table 16
Examples of Flying Outside the Envelope
Accident
Report
04-04

01-02

05-01

06-03

Examples
The probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical
stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by
the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs.
Continuation of the approach to a landing when the company’s max
crosswind was exceeded and use of reverse thrust greater than 1.3 engine per
ratio after landing.
The excessive vertical and lateral forces on the right main landing gear during
the landing exceeded those that the gear was designed to withstand and
resulted in the fracture of the outer cylinder and the collapse of the right main
landing gear.
The captain’s calculations showed the airplane outside of acceptable weight
and balance limits.

Figure 12 shows us the word frequency tag cloud for this behavioral trap. The
most commonly found words were airplane, landing, captain, accident, approach,
company, and exceeding.
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Figure 12. Tag cloud for Flying Outside the Envelope.

Additional Contributing Factors Such as Airline Management, CRM issues,
and Fatigue. During the qualitative analysis, the SMEs discovered that many accidents
were also the result of factors outside of the five behavioral traps under study. These
factors included airline management, CRM issues, and fatigue. Airline management
causes are shown in Table 17. CRM issues are shown in Table 18. Any examples of
fatigue are presented in Table 19. A word frequency query within NVivo explored these
issues further. Thus, figures 13, 14, and 15 display the word frequency tag clouds for
each contributing factor, respectively.
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Table 17
Examples of Airline Management as a Contributing Factor
Accident
Report

Examples

00-02

According to flight plan and release documents, the airplane was dispatched
to ANC with left engine thrust reverser inoperative.

05-02

Executive airline’s manager of training and standards stated that, before the
accident, the company did not teach its pilots bounced landing recovery
techniques. The manager also stated that he would not want to conduct
bounced landing recovery training in the simulator because it was very
difficult to demonstrate.

93-03

Maintenance personnel use of an inappropriate manual engine star procedure,
which led to the uncommanded opening of the left engine air turbine starter
valve, and subsequent left engine fire.

93-03

The checklist deviations and other pilot procedural deﬁciencies noted by the
FAA during a special inspection, which included numerous en route
inspections about one month before the accident, suggest that the problems
identiﬁed in this accident regarding improper checklist procedures were
systemic at COA. If pilots fail to adhere to procedures during enroute
inspections by FAA inspectors, they most likely behave in a similar manner
when no inspector is present.

96-07

The ﬁrst ofﬁcer stated that when he and his classmates questioned the
absence of the [manual], the Flight Safety International simulator instructors
informed them that ValuJet wanted them to use the QRH “like a Bible” for
abnormal procedures. The ﬁrst ofﬁcer indicated that he and his classmates
stopped their ﬁrst simulator session and called the company to get an ofﬁcial
determination as to what guidance they should use for abnormal and
emergency procedures during routine ﬂight operations; he stated that ValuJet
management advised them to use the QRH instead of the manual.

91-09

The DC-9 Operations Manuals were basically developed by Ryan from the
airplane’s previous owner's Operations Manuals, and certain purported Ryan
practices were not incorporated into them. The requirement to conduct an
exterior inspection of the airplane at intermediate stops was one of those
practices not incorporated. In fact, the preﬂight inspection requirement in the
Ryan DC-9 manual clearly indicated that exterior inspections were required
only on originating ﬂights or after the airplane had been left unattended.
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Figure 13. Tag cloud for airline management contributing factors.

The most commonly used words found in the word frequency query for airline
management issues were airplane, procedures, company, and inspection.

Table 18
Examples of CRM Issues as Contributing Factors

104

Accident
Report
05-01
01-02
11-02

14-02

91-05

98-03

06-01

97-01

Examples
Proper CRM was not present. The captain never made a comment regarding
the deviations or helped the First Officer before landing.
The first officer indicated, in a post-accident interview that “there was no
discussion of delaying or diverting the landing” because of the weather.
The captain commented about the flap problem, neither crewmember
discussed a procedure or checklist to address it. The flight crew’s poor
communication and failure to follow operating procedures regarding flap
asymmetry, showed the lack of proper Crew Resource Management and
Negligence as a Flight Crew during the approach.
The captain changed the autopilot mode from the previously briefed profile
approach to vertical speed mode, initially setting the vertical descend rate to
about 700 fpm, then increasing it to 1,000 fpm; however, he did not brief the
first officer about the autopilot mode change
A lack of proper crew coordination, including a virtual reversal of roles by
the DC9 pilots, which led to their failure to stop taxing their airplane and alert
ground controller of their positional uncertainty in a timely manner before
and after intruding onto the active runway.
The captain did not adequately manage his crew resources when he failed to
call for checklist or to monitor and facilitate the accomplishment of required
checklist items.
After hearing the weather observation, the captain commented, “we’re not
getting in... we don’t have an ILS [instrument landing system].” The ﬁrst
ofﬁcer responded, “I know...go all this [expletive] way. Well, let’s try it.”
The captain responded, “yeah, we’ll try it.” About 30 seconds later, the
captain said, “I don’t want to...go all the way out here for nothing tonight,”
and moments later said, “I’ll be so happy when we have an ILS everywhere
we go.” The ﬁrst ofﬁcer concurred, and the captain continued, “I thought we
were gonna have it easy tonight.”
The ﬁrst ofﬁcer told Safety Board investigators that his goal after recognizing
that the ﬂaps were not extended was to get the captain to initiate a go-around.
Thirty seconds before touchdown, the ﬁrst ofﬁcer stated “want to take it
around?” and the captain replied “no that’s alright, keep your speed up here
about uh.” When the captain denied the ﬁrst ofﬁcer’s request to go around
and told him to keep his speed up, the ﬁrst ofﬁcer did not challenge the
captain’s statement. He also did not question the captain to determine his
reason(s) for continuing the approach. The ﬁrst ofﬁcer stated that there was
no time for discussion with the captain because the approach was so fast. The
ﬁrst ofﬁcer’s failure to question the captain’s decision to continue the
approach was inconsistent with the CRM training he had received that
emphasized the importance of sharing doubts with other crewmembers and
quickly resolving conﬂicts.
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92-05

08-01

95-03

94-01

06-01

92-05

93-04

06-03

The ﬂight engineer brought to the captain’s attention the airspeed deviation
but the captain never corrected; neither the ﬁrst ofﬁcer nor the ﬂight engineer
called for a go-around.
Safety Board concludes that, when the captain called for a go-around because
he could not see the runway environment, the ﬁrst ofﬁcer should have
immediately executed a missed approach regardless of whether he had the
runway in sight. The Safety Board further concludes that, when the ﬁrst
ofﬁcer did not immediately execute a missed approach, as instructed, the
captain should have reasserted his go-around call or, if necessary, taken
control of the airplane. During a post-accident interview, the captain stated
that he thought a transfer of control to perform a missed approach at a low
altitude might have been unsafe.
During the course of performing the missed approach procedure, the first
officer acted, without challenge, to a command from the captain to “down,
push it down.”
The flight crew ignored the present weather conditions and continued the
approach to land even during the unestablished approach, the captain took the
flight controls at the last moment when it was too late to correct or execute a
go around.
Captain asked, “what do you think?,” and the ﬁrst ofﬁcer responded, “I can’t
see [expletive].” About 2 seconds later, as the airplane continued to descend,
the captain stated, “yeah, oh there it is. Approach lights in sight.” Almost
immediately, the GPWS annunciated “two hundred” feet.
Shortly thereafter, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) revealed comments by
the captain on the ﬁrst officer’s ﬂying technique, such as “If you’re gonna ﬂy
that slow you gotta have more ﬂaps,” and “[unintelligible words] still don’t
have enough ﬂaps for this speed...add power...you’re not on the
glidepath...bring it up to the glidepath,” and “You’re not even on the
[expletive] localizer at all.” At 03 13, the captain stated “Okay, we’re gonna
have to go around...cause we’re not anywhere near the localizer...anywhere
near it.”
Inexplicably, the first officer reacted to the stick shaker by immediately
deciding that the captain should be flying and abandoning control of the
airplane to the captain without warning or proper coordination.
About 1 minute later, the ﬁrst ofﬁcer stated, “something’s messed up with
this thing,” and, at 0039:07, he asked “why is this thing?” At 0041:21, the
ﬁrst ofﬁcer stated that the control wheel felt “funny.” He added, “feels like I
need a lot of force. It is pushing to the right for some reason. I don’t know
why...I don’t know what’s going on.” The ﬁrst ofﬁcer then repeated twice
that it felt like he needed “a lot of force.” The CVR did not record the
captain responding to any of these comments.
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10-01

92-05

06-03
91-09

The reason the captain did not recognize the impending onset of the stick
shaker could not be determined from the available evidence but that the ﬁrst
ofﬁcer’s tasks at the time the low-speed cue was visible would have likely
reduced opportunities for her timely recognition of the impending event; the
failure of both pilots to detect this situation was the result of a signiﬁcant
breakdown in their monitoring responsibilities and workload management.
Failure of the crew to recognize and recover from an unusual attitude after
experiencing spatial disorientation or an attitude indicator failure during the
second missed approach.
The flight crew did not monitor the fuel quantity gauges or respond properly
to the airplane’s changing handling characteristics.
Flight crew's failure to detect and remove ice contamination from the wings
was a causal factor in this accident.

Figure 14. Word frequency tag cloud for CRM issues.

The words most commonly coded within CRM issues were captain, first, officer,
airplane, and approach.
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Table 19
Examples of Fatigue as a Contributing Factor
Accident
Report

Examples

06-01

The pilots were ﬂying their sixth ﬂight of the day and had ﬂown about 6
hours and 14 minutes in 14 hours and 31 minutes of duty time when the
accident occurred. CVR recorded a yawn on the ﬁrst ofﬁcer’s channel.

10-01

Each pilot made an inappropriate decision to use the crew room to obtain rest
before the accident ﬂight.

92-05

There were several obvious “misspeaks” by both pilots (drift vs. crab, and 25
degrees flaps vs. 23 degrees flaps) that may have indicated some degree of
fatigue. Notwithstanding the fact that the crewmembers of flight 805 were air
cargo operations veterans and had adapted to these types of disrupted
work/sleep schedules many times, this experience did not make them immune
to the possible adverse effects of fatigue or their ability to function
effectively.

08-01

The captain reported that he received only about 1 hour of sleep during the
night before the accident and, as a result, asked the first officer to be the
flying pilot for the flight.
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Figure 15. Tag cloud for fatigue as a contributing factor.
The most commonly coded words within fatigue were accident, fatigue, sleep, crew, and
room.

Relational Analyses. Similar to the quantitative statistical analysis in which few
significant relationships were found between the behavioral traps and the various factors
associated with the accident, no strong or even moderate associations were established
using NVivo for the relational analysis and the qualitative component of the study.
Figure 16 displays a Hierarchy chart, in the form of a tree map, when all
behavioral traps are taken into consideration and mixed with the contributory factors. A
tree map is a diagram that shows hierarchical data as a set of nested rectangles of varying
sizes. The chart uses size to represent the amount of coding at each node. Rectangle size
indicates amount, for example, the number of nodes coded or amount of coding
references. Larger areas display at the top left of the chart; smaller rectangles display
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toward the bottom right. This figure can help us visualize the prevalence of all issues
within the qualitative analyses of the accidents. The top three concerns related to the
accidents were Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists; Loss of
Situational Awareness; and CRM issues.

Airline
Management

Loss of Situational Awareness

Peer
Pressure

Get-ThereItis

Fatigue

Figure 16. Word tree indicating the prevalence of all factors considered during the
analysis of the NTSB accidents.
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Flying Outside
the Envelope

CRM
issues

Unauthorized
Descent Below
and IFR
Altitude

Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight
Inspections, and Checklists

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Discussions
The current study was aimed at discovering how and which behavioral traps were
present in Part 121, and what relationships, if any, existed between the behavioral traps
and factors such as pilot age, pilot flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of
day, and the first officer certification level.
In general, behavioral traps were found in all (100%) of crew-related accidents
analyzed by SMEs (fatal and non-fatal). This finding aligns with Wetmore and Lu
(2005a; 2005b; 2006) who reported that hazardous attitudes were part of 86% of fatal
accidents with Invulnerability cited as the most predominant attitude. Invulnerability is
the hazardous attitude where pilots believe accidents happen to others and not to them.
This behavior is analogous to two of the behavioral traps studied: Unauthorized Descent
Below an IFR Altitude and Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and
Checklists.

Flight Experience. A moderate correlation, r = -.34, p = .05, was found between
the Captain’s Flight Experience and the behavioral trap known as Unauthorized Descent
Below an IFR Altitude. The sample size for the study was small (N=34). This
correlation coefficient would be significant if there was a larger N. This relationship
means that as experience or flight time increased, the chance of descending below an IFR
altitude decreased. This finding seems intuitive because generally pilots with more
experience should be able to identify and mediate their own unsafe behaviors. The
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results also agree with Wetmore and Lu (2005b), where pilot experience correlated with a
reduction of hazardous attitudes and with Rebok et al. (2005) where flight experience was
negatively associated with violations in commuter and air taxi pilots. The results do not
agree with Bazargan and Guzhva (2011) where, unexpectedly, pilots with fewer flight
hours were least likely to be involved in fatal accidents. However, their study, as is the
case with the majority cited within the literature review, was focused on the GA pilot.
According to Dismukes et al. (2007), low time first officers increase operational
risk. However, this study found that first officer experience had no significant
relationship to any of the behavioral traps.
To further explore the effect of flight experience, a new variable was created that
combined the experience of the captain and first officer. With this variable called
Collective Flight Experience (expressed as the sum of both crewmembers’ flight time) a
significant relationship was found with the behavioral trap known as Unauthorized
Descent Below an IFR Altitude, r = -.35, p < .05. Although this hypothesis was not
presented at the beginning of the study, it was a variable worthy of additional
examination because airlines could be interested in understanding how the combined
experience of their flight crewmembers may relate to descending below minimums
during an instrument approach in bad weather conditions. This finding could inform
individuals in flight management positions as to how best to combine flight
crewmembers when flying to destinations with inclement weather where an instrument
approach procedure is expected.
It is worth mentioning that this new variable, combining the collective flight
experience among the flight crewmembers, was also investigated to see if any
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relationships existed with the other behavioral traps. No significant relationships were
found.

Age. Cook (2002) found that an increase in age correlated with a decrease in
hazardous behavior. However, this current study concurs with Wetmore and Lu (2005b)
where age did not correlate to hazardous attitudes. In the present study, no relationship
was found between age and behavioral traps. This finding is the result of focusing the
research on strictly Part 121 airplane and crew-related operations, as opposed to the
previously mentioned (Cook) study where the aim was Part 135 and 121 fixed-wing
and/or rotorcraft operations. According to Drinkwater and Molesworth (2010), older
pilots are more willing to engage in risky behaviors. In addition, Li et al. (2005) and
Bazargan and Guzhva (2011) have established that older pilots are also more likely to be
involved in accidents (fatal and non-fatal). However, the focus of these last three
research endeavors, as opposed to the present study, was on the GA pilot.
Finally, the relationship between Time of Day (day versus night) and the
behavioral trap called Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists,
was significant at the p < .10 level, r = .31, p = .07. Essentially, as the value set for Time
of Day increased to that of Night (i.e., 2), the chance of this behavioral trap would also
increase. It has been established that the desire to complete a flight increases as pilots
near their destination (Dismukes et al. 2007; Kern, 1998). This finding suggests that as
the day expires and other factors such as fatigue and the desire to complete the flight as
planned come into play, pilots are more willing to disregard procedures. No other
correlations were found to be significant between all the variables studied and the
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behavioral traps (including the additional behavioral trap found called Flying Outside the
Envelope).

Qualitative Analysis
Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists was the most
widespread behavioral trap. This unsafe behavior was identified in 79% of the accidents
studied. Loss of Situational Awareness came in a close second place with representation
in 74%. Peer Pressure was found in 18% of accidents while the traps of Get-There-Itis
and Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude were both present in 15% of the
accidents.

Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists. A review of
the NTSB excerpts presented in the Results section confirms many prior discoveries in
that pilots, even air carrier aviators, might have a general disregard for rules or
procedures and underutilize many resources at their disposal (Dismukes et al., 2007;
Goglia, 2015; Rapp, 2015; Veillette, 2006). The findings of this study also align with
Klinect et al. (2001) where willful violations were present in 35% of regular air carrier
flights observed and a pilot study conducted by Velazquez et al. (2015) where Neglect of
Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists was the most dominant trap.
If airline flight operations are so highly scripted (Dismukes et al., 2007), why are
pilots unwilling to follow rules and established procedures? An explanation is that Part
121 pilots may experience a phenomenon called habitual noncompliance (Goglia, 2015).
Highly qualified pilots who routinely fly together under repetitive circumstances may
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constantly betray their own FOM processes. The NTSB and Goglia advocate the
installation of cockpit cameras to help ensure that pilots conduct themselves under
established protocols (Rapp, 2015).

Loss of Situational Awareness. The leading behavioral trap in fatal accidents
was Loss of Situational Awareness. This is not surprising because the concept involves
more than knowledge of the aircraft’s geographical or spatial position. It also comprises
the pilot’s consciousness of the different elements affecting the overall status of the
aircraft. These elements include weather, aircraft condition, crewmember state, and
mission or flight progress. If passengers are being transported, they also form part of the
expansive definition of situational awareness (FAA, 2008). Thus, any sign of spatial,
geographic, operational, or procedural disorientation would be coded under Loss of
Situational Awareness. As opposed to the previous behavioral trap of Neglect of Flight
Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists under Loss of Situational Awareness, the
crew may not be cognizant of danger. Sadly, this may explain it leading the prevalence
of behavioral traps under fatal accidents.

Peer Pressure. Human beings have a natural desire to conform to others, to be
accepted (Kern, 1998). As stated earlier, Peer Pressure can be verbal, or non-verbal,
obvious or subtle, intentional or unintentional, and its origin may be personnel or
organizational (Kern, 1998). In all but one case examined during this study, it was the
captain of the flight who was the source of peer pressure for the first officer. A look at all
the word frequency queries associated with the behavioral traps studied revealed that the
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word Captain is within the top five most commonly found words. It is evident that first
officers are automatically disengaging or suppressing their own arguments for the sake of
acceptance. This lack of assertiveness is further explained in a following section.
Finally, although there were instances of managerial factors that contributed to the
accidents, no overwhelming evidence was found that airlines provided organizational
pressure to crews of the ill-fated flights.

Get-There-Itis. As mentioned earlier, as the flight progresses, the pilots’ desire
to continue gets stronger (Dismukes et al. 2007; Kern, 1998). This tendency was
exemplified in Table 10 where four out of five cases of Get-There-Itis occurred during
the approach and landing phase. This finding confirms what Dismukes et al. (2007)
called plan continuation bias, a failure of the crew to “discontinue an approach when it
becomes inappropriate or dangerous to do so” (p. 280). Interestingly, the word frequency
tag cloud for Get-There-Itis, and for five out of the six behavioral traps studied, suggests
that behavioral traps occur mostly in the approach and landing phase of flight because the
words approach or landing both appear as top common words. This is not surprising
considering that the majority of aviation accidents, including commercial, occur during
the approach and landing phase of flight.

Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude. A look at Figure 9 reveals that
the word MDA or minimum descent altitude was among the most frequently found within
the documented sources. This finding initiated a search back into the NTSB excerpts
found in Table 11 to find out whether or not all instances of Descending Below an IFR
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Altitude were indeed associated with non-precision approaches or approaches where no
vertical guidance is available. The conclusion was a resounding yes. All cases of this
behavioral trap were associated with non-precision approaches. These types of
instrument approaches add complexity to the approach and landing phase of flight, more
so if the approach was originally a precision approach and due to technological
difficulties the crew was left with a different approach at the last minute.

CRM Issues. As indicated by the word tree in Figure 15, the third overall factor
contributing to the accidents was lack of CRM practices. This finding is not surprising
considering the most prevalent behavioral trap across all cases was Neglect of Flight
Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists. In addition, there was a presence of other
CRM-rescinding traps such as Peer Pressure, Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR
Altitude, Get-There-Itis, and the additional discovered trap of Flying Outside the
Envelope.
CRM is the epitome or ultimate expression of teamwork between flight
crewmembers prior, during, and after a flight. Good CRM practices are predicated on
following checklists, SOPs, conducting good preflight action, and engaging in proper
flight planning to prepare for unexpected events during flight. However, as seen
throughout this study, crews are falling under habitual noncompliance, and first officers
are demonstrating a lack of assertiveness. Broome (2011) believes pilots are rejecting
CRM.
Though CRM has evolved through many generations to the point that crews today
are aware that the best strategy is to manage threats and errors, it looks as if CRM
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training lacks an important component called attitude management training. Attitude
management is defined as “the ability to recognize hazardous attitudes in oneself and the
willingness to modify them as necessary” (FAA, 2009, p. G-1). Unfortunately, the FAA
CRM training guidance (AC 120-51e) does not provide any direction on attitude
management training nor does it provide any information about hazardous attitudes,
behavioral traps, or the various cognitive biases pilots are confronted with.
LOFT has been the preferred CRM training method for years. However, the
results of this study confirm many findings (Dismukes et al. 2007; Wagener & Ison,
2014) suggesting that this scenario-based training tool may not be applied effectively and
continuously. Dismukes et al. (2007) cites inadequate knowledge or experience provided
by training and/or guidance as a factor in 37% of NTSB accidents between 1991 and
2001. In other words, pilots were not given adequate instruction about problems known
by some of the sectors of the industry to exist or, “found themselves in challenging
situations for which they had received training, but the experience received from that
training was of inadequate fidelity to the actual situation, inadequately detailed, or
incomplete” (Dismukes et al., 2007, p. 298).

Conclusions
Although the quantitative portion of this study revealed there was a lack of
significance in nearly every variable studied (at the p < .05 level), this dissertation
accomplished many firsts and contributed considerably to the understanding of how
negative behaviors – specifically behavioral traps – are present in airline operations. No
published study had tackled behavioral traps in air carrier operations until now.

118

Secondly, this dissertation revises Jeppesen’s (2014) categorization of behavioral traps
among GA, instrument-rated, and commercial pilots. For example, it was discovered that
the behavioral trap of Flying Outside the Envelope is not exclusive to GA pilots; airline
pilots also exceed airplane operational tolerances. Finally, the study also makes public
how flight crews might be practicing CRM and tells the story of the captains’
preeminence. A look at all the word frequency queries associated with the behavioral
traps revealed that the word Captain is within the top five most commonly found words.
How effective is CRM if it is evident that first officers are automatically disengaging or
suppressing their own arguments for the sake of acceptance?
To begin, behavioral traps were present in all 14 CFR Part 121 accidents where
crew error was a causal or contributing factor of accidents between 1991 and 2013. The
top two behavioral traps were Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and
Checklists and the trap known as Loss of Situational Awareness which was the leading
behavioral trap in fatal accidents.
As shown in the previous chapter, there were no significant relationships between
the behavioral traps of Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists,
Loss of Situational Awareness, Get-There-Itis, and Peer Pressure, and factors such as age,
time of day, flight conditions, first officer experience, or first officer certification level.
However, a moderate correlation, r = -.34, p = .05 was found between the captain’s flight
experience and the behavioral trap known as Unauthorized Descent below an IFR
Altitude.
Flying Outside the Envelope should be included in the commercial category of
behavioral traps (Jeppesen, 2014) among commercial, instrument-rated, and GA pilots
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due to its presence in 21% of accidents analyzed. With the exception of Peer Pressure, all
other behavioral traps mainly occur in the approach and landing phase of flight. This
finding coincides with the phase of flight responsible for the majority of commercial
aviation accidents. Finally, Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude was
completely related to non-precision approaches or instrument approaches without vertical
guidance in the approach design.

Recommendations
Recommendations for Further Study. Because this study focused on 14 CFR
Part 121 crew-related accidents, any future studies can focus on Part 135 commercial and
air taxi operators. In addition, while the information contained in the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration’s ASRS accounts is self-reported by the pilots,
valuable information can be retrieved from these incident reports to continue to
understand pilot unsafe behaviors whether they are defined as hazardous attitudes or
behavioral traps.
Because Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists was the
top behavioral trap, additional research should focus on the reasons for customary
noncompliance and pilot motivation. While the NTSB and Goglia are advocating for
cockpit cameras to be installed in air carrier operations, perhaps a better approach would
be to scientifically review the flight data recorders. This assessment should be routinely
accomplished by airlines in a non-punitive way (Rapp, 2015).
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The relationship between the captain’s flight experience and Unauthorized
Descent Below an IFR Altitude approached significance and should be investigated
further using a larger sample size.

Recommendations for Industry. The creation of CRM and like programs does
not always guarantee the absence of unsafe pilot behaviors (Cook, 2002). However,
effective crew performance depends on both technical proficiency and interpersonal
skills. One of the main objectives behind the FAA’s CRM training has always been to
focus on crew member attitude and effectual teamwork. Because the FAA believes
attitudes can be changed or modified through training (1991), from a standpoint of
accident prevention, education and training focused on the top behavioral traps would
likely prove to have the highest payoff. This recommendation is especially true
considering that Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists is the
prevailing trap. Additional focus should be placed on: (1) the captain’s authority and
ability to identify and mediate unsafe behaviors, (2) the first officer’s ability to be
assertive and combat peer pressure, and (3) the approach and landing phase. The lack of
first officer assertiveness and preeminence of the captains should be addressed in
training, and even investigated in future studies. This former action could be done
through cognitive debiasing training and/or scenario-based training during LOFT
sessions where additional focus is on the interpersonal skills of flight crewmembers.
Because there was a moderate relationship between the captain’s flight experience
and the behavioral trap called Unauthorized Descent Below an IFR Altitude and a
significant relationship between collective (flight crew) experience and the same
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behavioral trap, individuals in flight operational management positions should be
cautious when assigning crews with low flight time to missions where inclement weather
is a factor.
Many behavioral traps exist in airline operation. The understanding of pilot
attitudes and their role in team dynamics or impact on CRM requires further study.
Finally, attitude management training is recommended in CRM training.
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APPENDIX B
Data Collection Device
Tally Sheet
BT = behavioral trap
PIC = Pilot-in-command (captain)
SIC = Second-in-command (first officer)
NTSB
report #

Primary
BT

Secondary
BTs

Flight
conditions

Weather

Day or
Night

SIC
Certification
Level

PIC
Age

PIC
Flight
time

SIC
Age

SIC
Flight
time

Notes on accident chain of events:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX C
Ground Lesson: Behavioral Traps
Objective(s): To familiarize the subject matter expert (SME) with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) harmful pilot attitudes known as Behavioral Traps.
To develop the SME’s skill in recognition of pilot behaviors that are
indicative of behavioral traps. Finally, to be able to properly evaluate
flight situations, using accident reports, and identify pilot conduct
revealing of behavioral traps.
Methods:

Lecture, audio visuals, and demonstration

Materials:

4 FAA videos, 2 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aviation
accident case studies, 1 Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) case study,
whiteboard, markers, highlighters, PowerPoint presentation, data
collection sheets, and notebook for memoing.

References:

FAA Flight Instructor Handbook, FAA Risk Management Handbook, and
Jeppesen Flight Instructor textbook.

Presentation:
Topics:
1. Behavioral Traps (Definitions and Descriptions)
a. Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections, and Checklists
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i. The pilot, without justification relies on short or long-term
memory, regular skills, and familiar routes instead of established
procedures.
ii. The pilot does not use checklists adequately.
iii. The pilot does not comply with company standard operating
procedures (SOPs).
iv. The pilot does not perform a complete preflight inspection.
v. The pilot does not devote time to proper flight planning or
preflight preparation.
vi. The pilot does not use all resources to become familiar with the
available information concerning the flight (weather, known ATC
delays, etc.).
b. Loss of Situational Awareness (SA)
i. The pilot allows events or situations to control pilot action.
ii. The pilot is in a constant state of surprise at what happens next.
iii. The pilot behaves in a reactive manner; loses the ability to
anticipate the next event. The pilot is not proactive.
iv. Pilot does not know the aircraft's geographical position.
v. Pilot is unable to recognize deteriorating circumstances.
vi. The pilot is unable to cope or deal with changes in a given
situation.
vii. The pilot exhibits poor workload management and consistently
gets behind the airplane.
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viii. The pilot loses overall awareness.
c. Peer Pressure
i. Rather than evaluating a situation objectively, the pilot’s decisionmaking is based on the emotional response to :
1. coworkers
2. passengers
3. other pilots
d. Get-There-Itis
i. The pilot is fixated on the original goal or destination combined
with a disregard for any alternative course of action.
ii. The pilot wants to satisfy a schedule.
e. Unauthorized descent Below an IFR altitude
i. The pilot descends below the minimum altitude during the en route
phase (MEA).
ii. Where no MEA exists, and the flight is conducted via direct routes,
the pilot descended below the Minimum Off-route Altitude
(MORA, as defined by the Jeppesen) or Off-route Obstruction
Clearance Altitude (OROCA, as defined by the FAA).
iii. The pilot descends below the minimum altitude during an
instrument approach (e.g., DA, MDA).
2. Data collection sheet (See Appendix B)
3. Qualitative Approach for Analysis: using the data collection sheet
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a. Coding and categorizing behaviors within the NTSB reports = the FAA
behavioral traps will be used as a priori codes. In other words selective
coding will take place (SME will code systematically with respect to the
FAA concepts).
b. Memoing = SME will record the thoughts and ideas as he reads the NTSB
reports. This helps make sense of the data. SME can memo on the
separate sheet of paper or, if the PDF program allows, the SME can insert
comments as he goes through the analysis of the documents.
c. Integrative sessions = the coding and memoing will be cross-compared
with the other SMEs that share the same NTSB report. This final act will
lead to new observations and/or linkages which could result in revisions in
the data collection process. It will also assist in reliability for the study.
4. Demonstration exercise example using the data collection sheet – Case Study 1
a. The behavioral traps will be identified using the NTSB Aviation Accident
Report (AAR) with an emphasis on the Probable Cause Section for the
Primary Behavioral Trap.
b. Any secondary behavioral traps will also be identified using the full
information in the NTSB report AAR.
Practice:

Case Study 2 (Accident to be determined)

Assessment:
1. Written Test covering the concepts, that is, the behavioral traps applicable to the
FAR Part 121 airline environment.
2. Practical Test: Case Study 3 (Accident to be determined).
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a. coding (individually; each SME)
b. memoing (individually; each SME)
c. integrative sessions (collectively; all SMEs)
Completion Standards: The lesson is complete when:
1. The SME demonstrates understanding of the FAA-defined behavioral traps by
passing the written examination test with a minimum score of 80% (the instructor
will review each incorrect response to ensure complete understanding).
2. The SME is capable of identifying and categorizing the behavioral traps using
NTSB Aviation Accident Reports. This includes proper use of the data collection
sheet.
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APPENDIX D
Short Biographies of SMEs
1. Omar Carle is Captain of a CE 650 and SD3 at MN Aviation in San Juan, Puerto
Rico. MN Aviation is a 14 CFR Part 135 company that conducts cargo and
passenger charter flights in the Americas. Omar has been very active in the
aviation industry for more than 13 years. He has experience in almost every
aviation field, from Part 61/141 Ground/Flight Instructor to Part 135/121
commercial line pilot. Previous to MN Aviation, Omar worked as a first officer
for American Eagle Airlines, a 14 CFR Part 121 organization and was Assistant
Chief Flight Instructor at the Inter American University of Puerto Rico.

Omar holds a B.S. in Aircraft Systems Management (Professional Pilot) from the
Inter American University of Puerto Rico - Bayamon Campus. He is a Certified
Flight Instructor (CFI) Certified Flight Instructor Instrument (CFII), and Multiengine Instructor (MEI), an Airline Transport Pilot with airplane multiengine category and holds four Type Ratings. Omar's passion for teaching has
evolved in the cockpit taking advantage of the CRM environment to motivate,
teach, and provide skills to young pilots, who he personally considers as
"Captains in Training".

2. Kevin Roman is a CRJ 200/701/900 Captain at PSA Airlines. Before he became
a pilot for the aforementioned 14 CFR Part 121 air carrier, Kevin worked as a
flight and ground instructor at Florida Institute of Technology (FIT). During his
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tenure at FIT, Roman worked with international students, specifically in the
Turkish Airlines program where students were prepared from their Private Pilot
certificate to the Commercial Pilot certificate in an intensive airline-like training.

Kevin Roman holds a B.S. in Professional Pilot from the Inter American
University of Puerto Rico. He is an ATP with airplane multi-engine category and
CL-65 type rating, Commercial Pilot with airplane single engine category, and a
Certified Flight Instructor (CFI, CFII, and MEI).

3. Oswart A. Mora is an Adjunct Professor and Chief Flight Instructor at the
School of Aeronautics of the Inter American University of Puerto Rico. The
School of Aeronautics conducts flight training under 14 CFR Part 141. In 2013,
Mora was instrumental in achieving FAA Part 141 certification for the School’s
flight operations. He is also a Flight/Ground Instructor and Captain in MN
Aviation San Juan P.R. under 14 CFR Part 135. Oswart Mora is very much active
within the local aviation community. He frequently collaborates with the
Organization of Black Aerospace Professionals providing voluntary courses to
motivate young kids towards a career in aviation.

Oswart holds a Master in Business Administration Degree in Finance from the
Inter American University of Puerto Rico – Metropolitan Campus and a B.S. in
Professional Pilot and a B.S. in Aviation Management, both from the Inter
American University of Puerto Rico - Bayamon Campus. He is a Certified Flight
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Instructor (CFI, CFII, and MEI), commercial pilot helicopter, and an ATP Multiengine.

4. Pablo J. Ortiz is a First Officer for Southwest Airlines. Prior to Southwest,
Pablo worked for Republic Airways Holdings as a First Officer flying the
Embraer 145. Later, Mr. Ortiz became a Captain and Check Instructor flying the
Embraers 145, 170, and 190. Prior to his professional airline career, Pablo
worked as a flight instructor for Middle Tennessee State University (MTSU) and
the Inter American University of Puerto Rico and was promoted as the Assistant
Chief Flight Instructor at both institutions.

Pablo Ortiz possesses a B.S. in Professional Pilot from the Inter American
University of Puerto Rico. He is an Airline Transport Pilot with multi-engine and
single-engine category and B-737, EMB 145, and EMB 170/190 type ratings. In
addition, he is a Gold Seal Certified Flight Instructor (CFI, CFII, MEI) and
Advanced Ground Instructor (AGI).
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